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Congress' increasing difficulties in controlling government expenditures
has led to significant budget process reforms over the past 20 - 25 years. The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (CBA) established
the Congressional Budget Committees and the resolution process in an attempt to
procedurally control government spending. However, growing annual deficits
(outlays in excess of revenues) throughout the 1970s and early 1980s led Congress
to enact additional statutory changes to its budget process. The 1985 Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act attempted to force the executive and legislative
branches to attain specific deficit reduction goals. The intent was to achieve
agreed upon deficit targets for each year, eliminating the deficit within five years.
If targets were missed, the President was required by law to make across-the-board
spending cuts called sequestration. GRH legislation failed to achieve its
objectives, primarily because the majority of federal spending was exempted from
the sequestration rules. Consequently, annual deficits continued to grow.
In the early 1990s, Congress changed its fundamental focus concerning
budget process reforms designed to reduce the deficit. Where GRH emphasized
bottom-line deficit reduction targets, the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990
focused on spending control. (Doyle and McCaffery, 1991) This method was
much more realistic concerning program funding requirements and it also
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highlighted the importance of maintaining sufficient revenue levels. For example,
discretionary spending caps were set over several years for defense, domestic, and
international programs based on "reasonable," policy-based, spending levels. This
contrasts sharply with a sequestration rule that arbitrarily cut these programs when
procedural and political impasse materialized during the budget process. On the
revenue and entitlement side, BEA legislation initiated the pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) procedure, whereby any proposed tax reduction or increase to
mandatory programs, e.g., Medicare/Medicaid, had to be offset by tax hikes or
reductions in other mandatory programs. Under this new legislation, aided
significantly by the end of the Cold War and a strong economy, the deficit had
been eliminated by the end ofFY98.
Under current budget rules and legislation, the congressional budget,
authorization, and appropriation committees rely on CBO estimates to "score"
compliance with spending limitations. Differences between FY99 CBO estimates
of defense outlays and those generated by DoD created significant problems for
the congressional committees and DoD. On 2 April, 1998, Senator Pete
Domenici, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, received a joint memo-
random from the Directors of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concerning the Department of Defense
(DoD) FY99 Budget. This memo informed the Chairman that the CBO estimate
of DoD's FY99 outlays associated with the President's proposed budget was $3.7
billion higher than the Department's estimate. (Raines and O'Neil, 1998) Under
the CBO estimate, the Department's outlays would exceed FY99 defense spending
targets established in both the Senate-passed FY99 Budget Resolution and the
1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA).
In order "to bring bills to the floor that comply with the outlay constraints
of the BBA, the Defense Committees can either (1) restructure defense programs
to reduce outlays, (2) cut total defense budget authority, or (3) take other steps,
with the approval of the Budget Committees, to alleviate the problem." (Daggett,
October 1998) Significant adjustments to DoD's FY99 Budget would be required
if CBO's estimate was to prevail. Congressional and DoD experts agreed that
such adjustments "would have a devastating impact" on near-term defense
readiness. (U.S. Senate, April 1998)
Alternative one would require a complete restructuring of the FY99 defense
budget by reducing "funding in areas that spend-out quickly while increasing
funding in areas that spend-out more slowly." (Daggett, October 1998) This
alternative raises significant defense readiness and morale issues within Congress
and the Department. Reducing the FY99 "quick spending" appropriations, i.e.,
O&M and Personnel, would have immediate impacts on training, equipment
readiness, and compensation related activities. Secretary of Defense Cohen, in a
March 24, 1998 memo, indicated that the potential reduction would have a severe
and "unacceptable" impact on our current military readiness. (Cohen, 1998)
Cuts to DoD's FY99 budget authority, alternative two, could also
significantly impact DoD due to the magnitude of cuts required to achieve the
necessary outlay adjustments. Since only 60 percent of new Budget Authority
(BA) is spent in the first year, across-the-board cuts in BA greater than $6B would
be required to achieve the necessary outlay savings. If the committees try to limit
the impact on the O&M and Personnel Appropriations, the magnitude of BA cuts
in the investment accounts, e.g., procurement, would have to be even greater.
(Daggett, October 1998)
Finally, the congressional defense committees could seek help from the
Budget Committees. In essence, the defense committees could seek an adjustment
to defense outlay targets and/or movement away from exclusive use of CBO
estimates to score outlay compliance.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
My research focuses on the emergence and resolution of the outlay
estimation problem associated with the development and enactment of the fiscal
year (FY) 1 999 DoD Budget. During the budget development process, the CBO
estimated DoD FY99 outlays (dollars drawn from the U.S. Treasury) to be $3.7
billion higher than estimates submitted by DoD. My research identified and
analyzed the primary causal factors associated with this discrepancy and how it
was resolved.
My primary research question was: What was the cause of a significant
difference between DoD and CBO in estimating the outlays associated with DoD's
FY99 budget estimate submission? And, how was this problem resolved?
Subsidiary research questions were as follows:
1
.
What are the definitions of "budget authority" and "outlays" as they
relate to the federal budget? What is their significance for spending
constraints?
2. How are spending constraints related to the outlay estimate problem?
3. What is the history of DoD/CBO outlay estimate problems? How
have they been resolved?
4. What is the account-level breakdown of the FY99 outlay estimate
problem?
5. What was the final outcome/solution of the FY99 outlay estimate
problem?
6. Have new policies/procedures been implemented as a result of the
FY99 outlay estimate problem?
C. SCOPE
The management process by which the DoD budget is developed and
enacted comprises a highly complex mix of procedural and political elements.
Two fundamental objectives drive the DoD and congressional budget processes:
(1) to provide the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) with the best mix of forces,
equipment, and support; and (2) to achieve spending goals designed to contribute
to deficit reduction and the ultimate strengthening of the U.S. economy. (Zimmer,
1 996) The FY99 outlay estimate differences between DoD and CBO illustrated a
problem within these processes. To fully examine the issues contributing to this
problem, both procedural and political elements within DoD, OMB, and the
legislative branch (to include CBO) were analyzed. Although the process and
issues are complex, the FY99 estimate problem is specific and will thus limit the
scope ofmy study.
D. METHODOLOGY
Outlining my data requirements and analytical approach best summarizes
the methodology that was followed:
1. Data Requirements
Factual and analytical material on the FY99 outlay estimation problem
were not difficult to obtain. The outlay estimate problem represented a significant
FY99 budget issue due to the size of the difference between DoD and CBO, i.e.,
$3.7B, and the potential impact on military readiness or investment. Accordingly,
much has been written concerning the topic.
2. Data Analysis Approach
The amount of data on the FY99 outlay problem is substantial. In addition,
given the political framework that underscores all budget issues, balancing
"opinion" sources in order to ensure an objective analysis was necessary. There-
fore, I constructed the following framework to assess the data I accumulated:
a. I attempted to divide all incoming data into two primary
categories; those materials that were primarily process oriented and descriptive in
nature and those that seemed open to political interpretation. The intent here was
to separate facts driven by current regulations and directives and opinion data open
to political assumption and interpretation.
b. My detailed analysis focused on the "process" materials and
initially addressed those portions of the budget where the outlay estimate problem
was the largest. For example, the WCF 1 and the RDT&E, AF2 accounts
represented only two of the ten accounts that made up the outlay estimate problem,
yet they represented over 56 percent of the $3.7B problem. Using my approach
from (a) above, I focused on OSD/OMB and CBO data elements that captured the
process, procedures and assumptions that drove each of their outlay estimates.
c. Finally, I analyzed how the FY99 problem was resolved and
the solution's implication on future outlay estimate problems.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter I: Introduction . This chapter provides an overview of the FY99
outlay estimation problem and summarizes my research method and questions.
Chapter II: The Development, Review, and Enactment of the DoD Budget .
This chapter describes the management control and political processes used to
develop, review, and enact the DoD budget. Major elements of the processes are
explained including DoD's development of their budget estimate, the review and
compilation of that estimate by OMB, and the congressional review and enactment
process.
1 WCF: Working Capital Fund.
2 RDT&E, AF: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Air Force.
Chapter III: The FY99 Outlay Estimation Summary Data . This chapter
breaks down the FY99 outlay estimation problem by applicable account. My
intent was to highlight and focus on those accounts in which the outlay problem
was most severe. A general explanation of each account is provided since the
nature of each is a potential contributory factor to the outlay problem.
Chapter IV: Process Factors Associated with the FY99 Outlay Estimation
Problem . This chapter focused on OSD/OMB and CBO data elements that
captured the process and assumptions that drove each of their outlay estimates.
The focus was on published policy and rules, supplemented by information
obtained from interviews and written communications with officials involved in
these issues.
Chapter V: Process Solutions and Future Implications . This chapter
assesses and summarizes the relative causal factors associated with the FY99
outlay estimation problem and how the problem was ultimately resolved. Prior-
year outlay estimate problems and solutions were explored to determine if signifi-
cant and relevant patterns existed. Implications for future outlay estimation
problems were identified.
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations . This chapter sum-
marizes previously developed issues and my findings. I also provide potential
topics for additional research.
F. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
I sought to fully explain the significant causal factors associated with the
FY99 DoD/CBO outlay estimate difference and how the problem was ultimately
resolved. Congress has repeatedly reformed the budget process in order to
"procedurally" control their fiduciary responsibilities. However, the U.S. political
system is highly fragmented, thus, it seems heavily resistant to centralized power
and "procedural" efficiency. By documenting and analyzing the causal factors
associated with the FY99 estimation problem, our civilian and DoD leadership
will be better able to anticipate, address, and possibly avoid future outlay estimate
problems and the significant budget/readiness problems they represent.
10
II. THE DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW, AND ENACTMENT OF
THE DOD BUDGET
A. INTRODUCTION
The DoD budget reflects this government's choices among competing
national security priorities. The process by which this document is developed and
enacted is highly complex. However, its defined purpose is straightforward - "to
provide the CINCs with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support that is
attainable within fiscal constraints." (Zimmer, 1996)
Federal budgeting consists of four main phases: (1) preparation and
submission of the budget by the President to Congress; (2) the congressional
enactment process; (3) execution of "budget-related" laws by federal departments;
and (4) audits of agency spending. (Oleszek, 1996) This thesis focuses on the
first two phases and describes the key elements and management control
mechanisms by which the DoD portion of the President's budget is developed and
approved via congressional action.
Several actions summarize the first two phases of federal budgeting, as they
relate to DoD. The first step is the budget phase of DoD's Programming,
Planning, and Budgeting System, which includes command and agency budget
estimate submissions (BESs) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
review process. "As agencies formulate their budgets, they maintain continuing
contact with the OMB examiners assigned to them. These contacts provide
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agencies with the guidance in preparing their budgets and also enable them to alert
OMB to any needs or problems that may loom ahead." (Keith, 1997) Agencies
submit their final budget estimates to OMB in late summer or early fall, following
which they are "reviewed by OMB staff in consultation with the President and his
aides." (Keith, 1997) The final President's budget is submitted to Congress no
later than the first Monday in February.
The second phase of federal budgeting is the congressional enactment
process, which includes the budget resolution, authorizations, and appropriations.
If Congress changes entitlement spending or revenues, it will also enact reconcil-
iation legislation. With the exception of the budget resolution, all congressional
budget bills must be approved by the President.
B. DOD BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION (BES) AND REVIEW
The purpose of DoD's budgeting phase is to translate programmatic
decisions into "detailed" resource requirements consistent with the appropriation
format required by Congress. The budgeting phase begins when field operating
commands and DoD agencies provide their BESs and accompanying justification
in accordance with program guidance, resource limitations, and decisions made by
the President and passed to the services via the Secretary of Defense.
BESs are then reviewed jointly by budget analysts within OSD and OMB.
During this review process, hearings are held to assess conformity of the services'
BESs with previously provided programming guidance and decisions. Program
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Budget Decisions (PBDs) will ultimately be signed by the Deputy, Secretary of
Defense (DEPSECDEF) or the OSD Comptroller in order to adjust the services'
BESs. Normally, draft PBDs are released by the OSD staff prior to final signature
which allows the services a chance to "reclama" a proposed PBD. The reclama
process is designed to give the services a chance to provide supplemental
information that challenges the basic argument of the proposed PBD.
Finally, the services have one last chance to challenge a signed PBD
reduction. If the respective service chief believes that the PBD is serious enough,
he/she may initiate the Major Budget Issue (MBI) Process. This process triggers a
meeting between the service secretary and the SECDEF to discuss and resolve the
disagreement.
C. PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET SUBMISSION
The services adjust their BESs based on the results of the budget review
process (PBDs and/or MBIs). OMB then compiles all portions of the federal
budget for inclusion in the President's Budget. "Following a top line meeting with
the President, the President's budget is finalized" and submitted to Congress.
(Zimmer, 1996)
In reality, presidential and/or SECDEF influence has been present
throughout the BES review process. This influence occurs via the DoD
Comptroller who is primarily responsible to the SECDEF for the budgeting
process and draws on other organizations within OSD to keep abreast of key
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budgetary issues within the Department and the services. In addition, OMB staff
members work directly at the Pentagon and participate in the budget review. "The
defense budget is unique in the extent to which OMB is directly involved
throughout the budgeting process." (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 28) This
helps ensure White House influence and information flow throughout the process.
D. THE CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT PROCESS
The congressional enactment process consists of three main phases: (1)
budget resolution, (2) authorization, and (3) appropriation (Phases 2 and 3 occur
more or less concurrently).
1. The Budget Resolution
The budget resolution process was established as part of the Congressional
Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974. "The process is centered around
an annual concurrent resolution on the budget that sets aggregate budget policies
and functional priorities for a multiyear period. (Keith, 1997) The budget
resolution process represents a key procedural reform Congress enacted to
improve the budget process. The resolution process affords Congress the oppor-
tunity to internally address and achieve broad budget-related goals by establishing
revenue and spending limits and facilitating enforcement of those limits through
points of order. (Keith, 1997)
To this end, the '74 Act established the House and Senate Budget
Committees and assigned them various enforcement responsibilities within the
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resolution process. First, the committees are responsible for drafting their
respective concurrent budget resolutions that set and allocate ceilings within which
authorization and appropriation committees work. The Budget Committees are
ultimately responsible for making these allocations; however, the amounts
represent the culmination of a collaborative process involving all the committees
affected. Thus, the final allocations "are based on assumptions and understand-
ings developed in the course of formulating the budget resolution." (Keith, 1997)
Second, the '74 Act designates the House and Senate Budget Committees
as the "principle scorekeeper for Congress." (Keith, 1997) "Scoring" is the
process of analyzing and measuring the budgetary impact of policy and legislation.
The scoring process works to inform Members whether action being considered
will potentially break budget levels agreed to in the budget resolution or
committee sub-allocations. CBO analysts assist the Budget Committee chairmen
in accomplishing their respective scorekeeping responsibilities. (Keith, 1997)
Finally, the '74 Act "provides for both substantive and procedural points of
order to block violations of budget resolution policies and congressional budget
procedures. (Keith, 1997) In this way, the Budget Committee chairmen use
House/Senate rules to help enforce budget policy set during the resolution process.
Typically, when a revenue or spending measure is brought to the floor, the
respective Budget Committee chairman will advise the chamber if the pending
legislation violates any points of order. The House or Senate will only consider
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the legislation if no points of order are made or the points of order are waived.
The House normally waives points of order by enacting a special rule. The Senate
requires either unanimous consent or a motion, approved by a three-fifths vote, in
order to waive points of order. (Keith, 1997)
Political and fiscal pressures, i.e., varying presidential and congressional
priorities, deficit reduction or surplus enhancement, revenue and entitlement
issues, etc., make the budget resolution process a key element toward enabling
budgetary control within the U.S. Government. Significant changes to the
President's budget are often proposed and enacted as part of this highly interactive
and political process.
2. The Authorization Process
The second phase of the enactment process is the authorization process.
House and Senate rules establish the authorization committees. Their purpose is
to set policy and establish governmental programs. The key authorization
committees concerned with defense issues are the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). As a
means of management control, HASC and SASC hearings begin after the
President's State of the Union message. Hearings at all management levels go on
for several months analyzing all aspects of DoD's portion of the budget
submission.
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3. The Appropriations Process
The appropriations process represents the final stage of the congressional
enactment process. The 13 annual appropriation bills, developed by the House
and Senate Appropriation Committees, provide the budget authority required to
operate the government. Hearings for the appropriations process are conducted in
a manner similar to the authorization process.
4. The Congressional Appeals Process
In addition to direct hearings, an informal congressional appeals process is
conducted concurrently with all three phases of the enactment process and is
available for executive branch and DoD officials to voice concerns regarding
congressional action. Appeal materials generally consist of letters sent to
committee chairmen that outline the department's view on a program, policy, or
issue impacted by congressional action.
The final step in the enactment process occurs when Congress forwards
proposed authorization and appropriation legislation to the President for signature.
The president can either sign or veto any one of the proposed bills. A Presidential
veto requires a two-thirds majority of Congress to override and pass the legisla-
tion. Assuming the President signs the legislation, the bill becomes law and the
execution phase begins.
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E. BUDGET AUTHORITY (BA) VS. OUTLAYS
Through the congressional enactment process, Congress provides the DoD
annual BA by appropriating funds via annual appropriation acts, primarily the
Department of Defense and Military Construction Appropriation Acts. The
Department of Defense Appropriation Act is further divided into functional
appropriation titles to include, Military Personnel; Operations and Maintenance
(O&M); Procurement; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E);
and Revolving and Management Funds. (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, pp. 15-
16) BA allows commands and agencies to enter into contractual obligations for
the procurement of goods and services. "Obligations are incurred by signing
contracts, placing orders, hiring personnel, making loans or grants, or the like.
(See 31 USC 1501)" (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 5) In contrast, "outlays
represent the actual expenditure of funds in payment of goods and services,
usually in the form of a disbursement of cash, a check, or an electronic fund
transfer." (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 5) Thus, outlays occur only when
dollars are actually drawn from the U.S. Treasury.
Some appropriations draw actual dollars from the Treasury much more
slowly than other appropriations. For example, procurement contracts may be
paid over several years while a high percentage of O&M and personnel
"The phrase defense budget usually refers to budget authority for defense programs, while defense
spending usually refers to outlays for defense programs. The distinction is not always made, however."
(Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 5)
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expenditures will be paid in the first year of the congressional appropriated BA.
As this analysis will reveal, understanding the expenditure characteristics of the
BA level approved via the budget process is critical to determining the outlays that
will eventually materialize. Outlays in any given year result from both that year's
new BA and BA provided in previous years. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of
the relationship between BA approval and actual outlay spending for the entire
federal budget, using fiscal year 2000 budget data.




















Source: (Analytical Perspectives, 1999).
Figure 2.1. Relationship of Budget Authority (BA) to Outlays for
FY00 (Dollars in Billions)
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Forecasting annual outlay spending levels is difficult because of varying
spending rates (within and across appropriations), the impacts from continual
executive branch and congressional policy changes, and the overall procedural
complexity of the process. As a consequence, "outlays in any given year, resulting
from new BA and from BA provided in prior years, must be estimated based on
historical experience." (Daggett, October 1998) As a result, CBO and OMB-DoD
analysts often disagree when estimating the outlays associated with the
administration's budget requests.
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III. FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATION SUMMARY DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
My analysis of the FY99 outlay estimate problem begins by isolating the
account-level differences between CBO and OMB-DoD outlay estimates. My
intent is to highlight those accounts in which the outlay problem appears to be
most severe. In addition, I will provide a brief explanation of each account since
the execution characteristics of each may contribute to the outlay estimate
problem.
B. SIZE OF THE OVERALL FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE PROBLEM
AND ACCOUNT-LEVEL BREAKDOWN
As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Chapter II), outlays in any given year result
from both the new BA provided for that year and previously appropriated BA.
Thus, the difference in CBO and OMB-DoD FY99 outlay estimates results from
estimates of the outlays associated with the FY99 BA and outlays for FY99 from
previously appropriated BA.
Summarizing their FY99 outlay estimate discrepancies, the directors of
CBO and OMB indicated that:
CBO estimates that discretionary outlays for defense in fiscal year
1999 will be $3.7 billion higher than OMB estimates, assuming
enactment of the Administration 's budgetary proposals. Of that
difference, $1.5 billion results from differing outlay rates and $2.2
billion resultsfrom disagreements about prior year outlays. (Raines
and O'Neill, 1998)
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The $3.7B outlay estimate difference cited by CBO and OMB included the
entire national defense budget function (050). Budget function 050 "encompasses
not only DoD programs but a number of defense-related activities administered by
other federal agencies." (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, pp. 2-3) Budget
function 050 is divided into three sub-functions including: (1) sub-function 051,
Department of Defense - Military; (2) sub-function 053, Atomic energy defense
activities; and (3) sub-function 054 Defense related activities.
4
For purposes of
my analysis, I will focus on those accounts within budget sub-function 051.
The vast majority of the $3.7B discrepancy ($3.582B) falls within budget
sub-function 051. In addition, limiting the analysis to budget sub-function 05 1 is
consistent with the overall thesis objective of determining the primary causal
factors contributing to the outlay estimate differences between CBO and OMB-
DoD associated with DoD's FY99 budget estimate submission.
Over 90 percent of the $3,582 billion outlay estimate discrepancy occurs
within ten budget sub-function 051 accounts. Table 3.1 summarizes the
CBO/OMB-DoD outlay discrepancies within these ten account areas and
illustrates the relative size each 05 1 account contributed to the total discrepancy.
It also indicates how much of the difference is associated with estimates of
outlays from new BA and from previously appropriated BA. A preponderance of
"What was formerly sub-function 052 (Foreign Military Sales) was transferred to Function 150
(International Affairs) in 1978." (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 16)
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Table 3.1. Summary Chart ofCBO/OMB (DoD) FY99 Outlay
Estimate Differences (in millions)
SUMMARY CHART OF CBO / OMB(DoD) FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE DIFFERENCES
(in millions)
(negative dollars reflect CBO outlay estimates < OMB)
ACCOUNT AREA Due to new (F Y99) BA Due to pnor FY BA Total Ditlerence % of Total % of Total
(Combined O&M)
WCFs 253 1,111 1.364 38 08%
RDT&E, AF (note 1) 380 287 667 18 52%
O&M. AF (note 2) (153) 350 197 5 50%
11.95%O&M. ARMY 294 (176) 118 3.29%
O&M.MAVY (66) 179 113 3.15%
SCN(note3) 20 220 240 6.70%
OP. AF (note 4) 220 (54) 166 4.63%
APN (note 5) 67 100 167 4.66%
BRAC(note6) 128 (3) 125 3.49%
Former Soviet Union - 109 109 3.04%
Other (note 7) 311 5 316 8.82%
TOTAL 1,454 2,128 3,582 100%
note 1: Hesearch Development Test & Evaluation, Air Force
note 2: Operations & Maintenance, Air Force note 5 Aircraft Procurement, Navy
note 3: Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy note 6 Base Realignment & Closure
note 4: Other Procurement, Air Force note 7: Net difference ofapprox 100 accounts
Source: (Raines and O'Neill, 1998; DoD Spring 1998).
the outlay estimate problem (over 75 percent) is associated with four specific
account areas: (1) WCF 38.08 percent, (2) RDT&E, AF 18.62 percent, (3) the
O&M accounts 1 1.95 percent, and (4) SCN 6.7 percent.
A second way to analyze the data is to measure the size of the estimate
difference relative to the total BA within each account area. Table 3.2 provides
this data comparison for the four specific account areas mentioned above.
As illustrated in Table 3.2, the outlay estimate differences represented
relatively small percentages of each of their respective accounts. In addition, the
small and somewhat similar percentage levels illustrate relative consistency across
accounts regarding outlay estimating difficulty. A large percentage spike in any
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one account might reveal estimating difficulty within that account since relative
size was considered in the analysis. This type of analysis could be important in
identifying outlay estimating trends and/or difficulties within specific accounts.
Table 3.2. FY99 Outlay Estimate Differences as a Percent of Total
BA (in millions)
FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE DIFFERENCES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL BA
(in millions)
ACCOUNT AREA Total Difference Total BA 7o of Total % of Total
(Combined O&M)
WCFs 1,354 61,000 2.24%
RDT&E,AF(note1) 667 13,598 4.91%
O&M, AF (note 2) 197 19,177 1.03%
0.73%O&M, ARMY 118 17,273 0.68%
O&M, NAVY 113 21,927 0.52%
SCN (note 3) 240 6,253 3.84%
note 1: Research Development Test & Evaluation, Air Force
note 2: Operations & Maintenance, Air Force
note 3: Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy
Source: (DoD, December 1998; OSD Compt).
However, the primary concern from the perspective of the Budget
Committees and CBO is the actual dollar amount of the respective estimate
differences. In fact, it's the total estimate difference that fuels the problem and
becomes the focus of the solution - not how big the problem is relative to BA
totals.
The four accounts highlighted above represent the key area of concern
regarding the FY99 outlay estimate problem. Given the relative weight, in terms
of dollar value, of their contribution to the outlay problem, these four areas will be
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the focus of this thesis. The remainder of this chapter provides a preliminary
description of the execution characteristics of these four account areas.
C. WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS (WCFS)
WCFs consist primarily of stock funds or industrial funds. Stock funds
support supply-related activities, to include "clothing, medical supplies, fuel,
construction supplies, ordinance repair parts, consumable aircraft and missile
parts, tank and automotive supplies, and general retail supplies." (Tyszkiewicz
and Daggett, 1998, p. 16) Industrial funds support primarily logistics and main-
tenance related activities to include equipment overhauls and transportation
services. (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 16)
DoD WCF activities operate under a revolving fund concept. In a sense,
these activities operate much the same as any retail/wholesale enterprise by using
their receipts to pay operating expenses and purchase new stock. However, their
primary customers comprise other DoD activities and organizations. Thus,
government funds flow into these activities from a variety of sources/accounts and
are not actually disbursed until the WCF activity pays operating expenses or buys
additional inventory. Figure 3.1 illustrates the typical operation and funding flow
for a WCF activity:
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, Congress appropriates a one-time cash "corpus"
(a principle or capital sum) to initiate the fund and provide financing for WCF
operations and inventory. DoD WCF customers receive, via their respective
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Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California
WCF A Revoivinq Fund
5. REIMBURSESTHE \1£a
(Defense Hnancea^ccoinTiirig Service)
Source: (PCC Companion Guide, 1998).
Figure 3.1. WCF - A Revolving Fund
funding chains, annual BA appropriated by Congress, and use this BA to purchase
goods and services from WCF activities. WCF activities, in turn, use the receipts
from DoD customers to reimburse the corpus and further finance operations and
inventory. (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 16) As we will discuss in Chapters
IV and V, this complex funding flow significantly impacts the outlay estimating
process.
As a result of the wide variety of products and services purchased via
DoD's WCFs, several different accounts and spend-out rates can apply to WCF
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fund execution. In general, the DoD's WCFs execute O&M dollars and therefore,
WCF outlays are most heavily influenced by O&M spend-out rates. However,
WCF spend-out rates are also influenced by the execution characteristics of the
RDT&E and procurement accounts, since these funds are also received and
disbursed by WCF activities. (PCC Companion Guide, 1998) The execution
characteristics of all three of these accounts are addressed below.
D. RDT&E
RDT&E accounts include "development and testing of weapons and
equipment, development of prototypes, fabrication of technology-demonstration
devices, and support of basic research and exploratory development of
technologies with potential military applications." (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett,
1998, p. 16) Specific analysis of RDT&E, AF spend-out rates is less complex
than analysis of WCF rates, since the account is funded within a single
appropriation title (RDT&E). The RDT&E appropriation provides multi-year BA
that retains its obligational authority for two years and its expenditure authority for
an additional five years. Figure 3.2 displays the appropriation timeline for the
RDT&E obligation and expenditure time periods.
As indicated in Chapter II, Section E, the obligation period represents the
timeframe in which commands and agencies can use new BA to enter into
contractual obligations for the procurement of goods and services. In addition,
legitimate adjustments to these obligations can be made throughout the seven year
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Source: (PCC Companion Guide, 1998).
Figure 3.2. Appropriation Timeline FY99 RDT&E Example
period. Actual expenditure of funds related to these obligational contracts and
adjustments can, by law, occur throughout the obligational and expenditure
periods. It is this actual expenditure rate that is most relevant to estimating outlays
within a particular account/appropriation.
E. O&M ACCOUNTS
Although the April 98 CBO/OMB joint memo, summarized in Table 3.1,
lists three separate O&M accounts, I have grouped them together because they all
display similar execution characteristics. O&M is an annual appropriation,
funding day-to-day operational requirements within the services. These include
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aircraft "flying hours, ship operations, training for land forces, individual training
and exercises, real property maintenance and minor construction projects, the
purchase of fuel, repair parts, supplies, minor items of repair equipment, and
various personnel, base operating, and administrative support activities."
(Tyszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998, p. 15) The obligation and expenditure timeline
for O&M accounts is illustrated in Figure 3.3.















Source: (PCC Companion Guide, 1998).
Figure 3.3. Appropriation Timeline FY99 O&M Example
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F. SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY (SCN)
The SCN account is funded within the procurement appropriation. In
general, the SCN account "finances the construction of new ships and conversion
of existing ships, including all hull, mechanical and electrical equipment,
electronics, guns, torpedo and missile launching systems, and communication
systems." (NavCompt Manual, 1990) SCN within the procurement appropriation
is a multi-year account. Its typical obligation and expenditure timeline is
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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Source: (PCC Companion Guide, 1998).
Figure 3.4. Appropriation Timeline FY99 SCN Example
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Subsequent chapters will reveal that the WCF, RDT&E, and O&M
accounts represent BA levels that spend-out relatively quickly, i.e., most
expenditures occur within the first two years ofBA approval. Unlike these quick-
spending accounts, procurement funds, e.g., SCN, typically spend-out at a much
slower rate. The spend-out rate estimated for SCN is illustrated below, using the
average of the estimates provided by CBO and OMB:
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
5.1% 21.3% 22.9% 21.0% 10.2%
As these rates indicate, outlay levels in the SCN account are most heavily
influenced by prior year vice new BA funding levels. This result is typical of all
DoD procurement accounts, given the way Congress funds long-term/high-priced
programs. Congress' full-funding policy requires, with limited exceptions, that
"agencies must request an amount to be appropriated in the first year that they
estimate will be adequate to complete an economically useful segment of a
procurement or project, even though it may be obligated over several years."
(Analytical Perspectives, 1999) The intent of this policy is to ensure that decision-
makers take into account the total costs and benefits associated with a program
prior to approving resources. As a result of this policy, annual SCN BA levels
will often take several years to be fully executed/disbursed. Thus, outlays
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associated with annual BA levels will occur for several years as contracts are
awarded, ships are built, and delivery of final end-items are received.
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IV. PROCESS FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FY99
OUTLAY ESTIMATE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
In Setting National Priorities - Budget Choices for the Next Century
.
Robert Reischauer described the "symbolic" political role budget deficits have
played over the last 20 years:
Since the early 1980s, the deficit has become more than just another
problem to manage or try to solve. Deficits have become symbols....
In short, many important but divisive questions involving the
philosophy of government have merged into the debate over the
deficit. (Reischauer, 1997)
A key legislative outcome of these deficit-driven debates has been the
budget process reforms described in Chapter I. Of particular relevance to this
study are the discretionary spending reforms, i.e., discretionary caps, for both the
outlay estimation debate and ultimate deficit reduction.
As such, accurate outlay estimates become an increasingly important
element for budget process reforms in two areas. First, outlay projections are used
to establish benchmarks from which current and future policy objectives are
formulated and debated. Based on their January 1999 outlay projections, CBO
forecast federal budget surpluses for the next several years. (CBO, 1999, p. 1) As
a consequence, both political parties formulated policy objectives and determined
the affordability of those objectives based on the size of these surplus projections.
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Second, the ultimate accuracy of the outlay estimates and the policies they enable,
or limit, will directly contribute to our ability to control deficits in the future.
Given the significant political and practical role of outlay estimates, it's
important to understand the process by which outlay projections are determined.
In Chapter III, I showed that CBO and OMB-DoD had disagreed in the spring of
1998 concerning their FY99 outlay estimates. Additionally, I highlighted the four
account areas where their outlay estimate discrepancies were most severe. In this
chapter, I focus on the outlay estimating process and the specific CBO and OMB-
DoD methods that drove each of their FY99 forecasts.
I begin by summarizing the overall outlay estimating process and the
important budgetary factors that influence that process. This summary is helpful
in establishing an understanding of the complex environment within which both
CBO and OMB-DoD analysts formulate their estimates. Next, I compare and
contrast the methods CBO and OMB-DoD used to formulate their specific FY99
outlay estimates. Finally, I outline the specific assumptions and analysis used by
CBO and OMB-DoD in formulating their FY99 outlay estimates. These final two
sections help focus the discussion on the specific problems that led to the FY99
outlay estimate discrepancy.
B. THE OUTLAY ESTIMATING PROCESS
In concert with congressional budget reforms, i.e., spending control
legislation and procedures, the CBO and OMB-DoD are required to estimate the
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budgetary impact of budget requests and appropriation bills throughout the budget
estimate submission (BES) and legislative processes. The ability of analysts to
accurately estimate outlays is heavily influenced by both the complexities of the
process itself and analysts' ability to formulate realistic BA spend-out rates within
each 050 account.
1. The Variability and Complexity of the Outlay Estimating
Process
In an attempt to improve the outlay estimating process, legislation was
passed in the late 1980s requiring CBO and OMB to issue a joint report designed
to project both outlay rates and the influence of prior-year BA levels on the
upcoming budget cycle. "The clear purpose of the law is to minimize differences
between CBO's and OMB's estimates." (Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, p. 7)
Despite this legislation, outlay estimate differences between CBO and OMB have
persisted.
Failure of the CBO and OMB-DoD to accomplish the purpose of the
legislation reflects the inherent complexity of the analysis vice some other
bureaucratic inefficiency. The overall variability of the DoD's many programs
coupled with the impact that variability has on spending rates can easily explain
why two competent analysts could arrive at two different outlay estimate
conclusions. (Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, pp. 7-14) Several inherent problems
and complexities within the outlay estimating process are summarized as follows:
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a. "Outlay caps in the Balanced Budget Agreement (BBA) have
been more constraining than the limits on BA." (Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, p. 7)
This situation could conceivably influence the DoD to project lower, "more
optimistic," outlay estimates since lower estimates would increase the chances of
obtaining the requested BA levels.
b. Outlay estimates must be projected 7-10 months before the
budget year begins. That means that the most recent annual data for each account
is two years old before the budget year. For example, to develop the FY99 outlay
estimates, analysts had only FY97 actual execution data. Considerable uncertainty
about how a program may change during FY98 and FY99 must be extrapolated.
Given the variability in program execution, this represents a very complex extra-
polation and raises significant issues that must be resolved between CBO and
OMB-DoD analysts. The unpredictable time length associated with key policy
decisions or the variability of a contractor's work schedule are just two examples
of key execution issues greatly impacting outlay estimates. Unless analysts can
reach timely concurrence on such issues, different outlay estimates will continue
to pass to the congressional committees for final resolution. (Aycock and
Fontaine, 1998, pp. 12-13)
c. Legislative transfer authority complicates analyzing outlay
estimates for individual DoD accounts. Legislative transfer authority allows
agencies to move a limited amount of funds between accounts in recognition of
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program variability and the need for efficient execution. Within DoD, legislative
transfer authority ranges between $1.5 and $2.5 billion. Keeping track of the
amount and timing of this transfer authority can greatly complicate current and
future outlay estimates. (Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, pp. 13-14)
d. Finally, the complexity and interactions that characterize the
WCF make outlay estimation within this account very difficult to forecast,
especially as it relates to the timing of the actual disbursement/outlay. The WCF
buys a wide variety of goods and services from private sector suppliers with
revenues obtained from sales to other DoD customers. Consequently, a net outlay
only occurs when funds are actually spent from the WCF, i.e., to replenish stock,
pay salaries, make capital investments, etc. Management policy and execution
alternatives within the DoD and the WCF will greatly influence when a "net
outlay" occurs. This policy and execution area within DoD is particularly variable
given the impact of changing customer demand and the wide variety of goods and
services being procured via the WCF. (Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, p. 14)
2. Spend-Out Rates
Spend-out rates reflect how quickly BA is converted from spending
authority to actual disbursement of funds from the U.S. Treasury. These rates are
typically summarized as a percentage that indicates the amount of new BA
expected to be disbursed in the first year the funds are authorized and each
subsequent year thereafter. Accounts that support routine DoD operating
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expenses, research, and salaries are disbursed relatively quickly, while long-term
construction or procurement programs will typically take several years to be fully
disbursed. "For example, an account that consists largely of personnel costs might
have a spend-out rate of 90 percent in the first year and 10 percent in the second
year. In contrast, appropriations for a construction account might be disbursed
over a four-year period - for example, at a rate of 20 percent the first year, 40
percent the second year, 30 percent the third year, and 10 percent the fourth year."
(Aycock and Fontaine, 1998, p. 3)
As a result, these variations in spend-out rates largely determine the impact
BA levels will have on the timing of outlays. High first-year spend-out rate
accounts will be influenced primarily by the amount of BA authorized for that
particular year. Conversely, outlays for low first-year spend-out rate accounts will
be most heavily influenced by BA levels authorized in prior years. We can also
conclude that spend-out characteristics are driven primarily by the type of account
being funded. As such, an important element of the outlay estimate process is to
determine/estimate each account's unique spend-out rate. (Aycock and Fontaine,
1998, pp. 3-4)
In Chapter III, I highlighted four account areas that represented over 75
percent of the CBO/OMB-DoD FY99 outlay estimate discrepancy - WCFs (which
reflect primarily O&M spending characteristics); RDT&E; O&M; and SCN. Each
budget cycle, the DoD publishes their budget guidance which estimates the
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incremental outlay rates by 05 1 account that commands and agencies should use
as a guideline to analyze and estimate the budgetary impact of new BA request
levels. Table 4.1 summarizes these rates for the FY99 budget cycle in the
accounts that comprised the predominant portion, in terms of total dollar level, of
the FY99 outlay discrepancy.
Table 4.1. Outlay Rates to be Used for Incremental Changes
in BA Purchases (as Percent of BA Purchases)
Outlay Rates to be Used for Incremental Changes in BA Purchases







4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 7th Year
RDT&E, AF 6.07%
O&M. AF 40.18% 46.66% 7.18% 5.98%
O&M, A 42.47% 45.65% 7.69% 4.19%
O&M. N 60.07% 34.12% 3.69% 2.12%
SCN 4 90% 17.20% 22.20% 19 50% 13 80% 11.20% 11.20%
Source: (DoD, Outlay Rates, FY99).
DoD does not publish WCF rates as part of their budget guidance. Rather,
these rates are derived based on the type of WCF account, i.e., O&M, RDT&E,
Procurement, etc., and the amount that is expected to pass through the fund in a
given year. These rates are typically very high because DoD policy attempts to
achieve a zero Net Operating Result (NOR) within the WCF account each fiscal
year. In other words, they attempt to take in as much as they expect to spend. I
discuss this policy and its impact on the FY99 outlay discrepancy later in this
chapter (DoD, Outlay Rates, FY99; DoD, Spring 1998, p. 10).
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I have two purposes for including the rates in Table 4.1. First, displaying
these rates provides a general indication of how they are reflected in DoD
budgetary guidance. This helps clarify the previous discussion of spend-out rates
and their influence within the outlay estimating process. Second, it indicates the
typical spend-out rate characteristics for those account areas that were the primary
area of disagreement between CBO and OMB-DoD in FY99. While these
"incremental" rates are different than the aggregate rates that consider prior-year
BA influences, they do illustrate the relative spend-out "speed" between the
accounts. The primary area where CBO and OMB-DoD disagreed regarding
FY99 outlay estimates occurred in the relatively quick-spending accounts, i.e.,
WCF, O&M and RDT&E. The WCF discussion above and Tables 3.1 and 4.1
support this assertion.
C. THE CBO AND OMB-DOD OUTLAY ESTIMATING METHODS
Account-level spend-out rates reflect the foundation of both CBO's and
OMB-DoD's outlay estimating methodology. In "An Analysis of CBO's Outlay
Estimates for Appropriation Bills, Fiscal Years 1993-1997," Aycock and Fontaine
summarized the basic methodology CBO uses to estimate outlays:
CBO estimates spend-out rates and prior-year outlays by analyzing
the historical track record for each account. Because the
relationships between budget authority and outlays are generally not
constant from year to year, CBO reviews the actual results each
year so that its estimates reflect the most recent experience. CBO
begins the process when it prepares its preliminary baseline
projections in December ofeach year and refines the estimates after
it receives the Administration 's budget in February. The projected
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spend-out rates and prior-year outlays are used in CBO 's analysis
of the Administration's budget request and are usually reflected in
the estimates underlying the budget resolution adopted by the
Congress. (Aycock & Fontaine, 1998, p. 4)
In a spring 1998 briefing on the FY99 outlay estimate differences, DoD
analysts summarized their basic outlay estimating method as follows:
DoD-OMB makes a forward looking projection based on program
content (e.g., major new acquisition programs such as F-22, CVN,
and new procurement versus modification), the inter-relationships
between various accounts (e.g., such as O&M, WCF and advanced
billings), program execution experience, and changes to the
administration's original budget request. DoD-OMB adjusts to
trends that emerge from historical execution experience. Since
trends, in the short term, are difficult to identify and distinguishfrom
what may be a one time aberration, DoD-OMB estimates tend to be
derived by identifying a mid-point range using both trend and
average analysis techniques. This avoids placing too much weight
on a single year 's worth ofexecution data. (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 2)
Although the two basic methods are somewhat similar, i.e., an emphasis on
execution performance, changing historical trends, and future program/policy
analysis and adjustments, the differences in outlay estimates between CBO and
OMB-DoD analysts are a recurring theme.
Two overriding procedural issues contribute to this recurring outlay
estimate problem: (1) ineffective implementation by CBO and OMB of
congressional guidance, and (2) failure by CBO and OMB to effectively document
outlay estimating procedures.
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1. Ineffective Implementation of Congressional Guidance
As previously mentioned, legislation was passed in the late 1980s requiring
CBO and OMB to work together and issue a joint report designed to minimize
outlay differences prior to budget submission. Unfortunately, it appears that this
report, based on its current preparation timeline and content, can only serve as a
mechanism for identifying areas of outlay estimate disagreement.
Two examples illustrate this assertion. First, the CBO/OMB FY99 joint
report was not completed in time to serve as a viable FY99 budgetary planning
document. The law requires that the joint report be completed by December 15 th
of each year. If complied with, this date would provide OMB and DoD analysts
the time to adjust their BES to reflect areas of outlay consensus reached during the
preparation and submission of the report. Language from the Senate's FY99
Concurrent Budget Resolution reflected the Senate Budget Committee's frustra-
tion regarding the apparent disregard of the letter and intent of the statute.
Title 10 U.S.C 226 requires an annual CBO/OMB report to the
House and Senate Budget Committees, among others, not later than
December 15 of each year. The report is intended to identify the
outlay rates and other technical assumptions used in preparing
budget estimates. No such letter has been submitted for the 1999
budget as of the date of this resolution. The failure of OMB to
conform to more historically accurate outlay rates and the tardy
preparation of this letter has seriously complicated the Committee'
s
work. The Committee urges that the statutory requirement for this
letter be observed. (U.S. Senate, April 1998
, p. 15)
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Obviously by 20 March, the ability to use this reporting process to minimize CBO
and OMB outlay discrepancies prior to budget submission had long since passed.
This trend continued with the formulation of the FY00 budget. In an 8
February email, an OMB outlay analyst responded to my questions concerning the
FY00 outlay estimating process as follows: "I cannot share with you much of
FY2000 as it is still in the making. I have just completed drafting the joint letter
and it's beginning its long journey of coordination before our Director and CBO
Director sign it." (Gallo, February 1999) It's clear from both these comments and
the OMB/CBO preparation timeline that the intent of the joint report, "to identify
the outlay rates and other technical assumptions used in preparing the budget
estimates", is not being accomplished. (U.S. Senate, April 1998, p. 15) As
summarized in CBO's stated outlay-estimating method, they don't even begin
their "preliminary" baseline projections until December, and only refine their
estimates after they receive the Administration's budget in February. This
timeline is clearly at odds with "resolving/minimizing" outlay estimate differences
prior to the Administration's BES.
A second example of ineffective implementation of congressional guidance
on joint CBO/OMB outlay estimation is the fact that the content of the joint letter
simply lists account areas, spend-out rates, and prior-year outlays where the two
parties agree and disagree. While the report may be a useful mechanism to ensure
that both sides are engaged in the problem, the overall intent of the joint report is
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not achieved since budgets are ultimately formulated and submitted without
resolution of the key technical and policy assumptions used to drive spend-out
rates and prior-year outlays. Consequently, failure to achieve the procedural intent
of the letter shifts the debate to Congress and seriously complicates the work of
congressional committees.
2. Need for a Documented Outlay Estimating Method
It's difficult to define with great precision the specific methods used by
both CBO and OMB-DoD in arriving at their respective FY99 outlay estimates. A
clearly defined and documented outlay estimating process or procedure does not
exist within either CBO or OMB-DoD. Comments by an OMB outlay analyst
support this fact: "How we estimate rates at OMB/DoD is an acquired skill with
no written budget guidance. One person did it for years, my predecessor did it for
two years, this is my second year, we learn from each other." (Gallo, February
1999) I received similar comments from a CBO outlay analyst, in a phone
conversation on 5 February 1999. (Christensen, February 1999)
The lack of a consistent and documented method for estimating outlays
within these two organizations further complicates this already difficult process.
A documented method could not resolve all estimate differences, especially those
driven by policy changes and their potential impact on future spend-out rates.
However, a basic method could establish similar statistical approaches and provide
a consistency to initial outlay estimates. For example, mathematical trend analysis
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parameters could be established for each account, i.e., a moving average of
specified length based on execution actuals. Specifying these parameters would
clearly establish the "initial outlay estimate" for a given level of BA. The
method/process could then allow for policy arguments and focused debate when
either agency wants to deviate from these "initial outlay estimates."
Without an initial starting point for outlay estimates and/or documented
procedures for establishing deviations from historical trend analysis, the chances
increase that significant outlay estimate discrepancies between CBO and OMB-
DoD will materialize. This fact, coupled with the timeline problems addressed
earlier, help explain the procedural difficulty CBO and OMB-DoD analysts have
faced in agreeing on outlay estimates prior to budget estimate submissions.
D. CBO AND OMB-DOD FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE ASSUMPTIONS
AND ANALYSIS
The FY99 outlay estimate discrepancy and debate reached its climax as the
congressional Budget Committees began their work. An OMB outlay analyst
summed up the outcome of the FY99 outlay estimating process: "OMB defended
its numbers to the budget committees and they directed CBO to use OMB rates."
(Gallo, February 1999) Since OMB-DoD are required to defend their outlay
estimate assumptions and analysis before the Budget Committees (and others),
documentation on their position is more readily available. In a spring 1998
briefing, DoD justified their FY99 outlay estimates. Their arguments within each
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of the four "problem" account areas (WCF; RDT&E, AF; O&M; and SCN) are
summarized below.
1. WCF
The WCF outlay discrepancy between CBO and OMB-DoD is primarily
attributable "to CBO not recognizing a DoD policy decision to raise cash (non-
outlay event) during FY99 in support of meeting the 7-10 days of (working) cash
requirements for the Defense WCF." (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 9)
In theory, DoD attempts to achieve a zero NOR within the WCF account
each fiscal year. They accomplish this goal by anticipating product and service
demands and setting customer rates such that all costs incurred each fiscal year by
the WCF activities are recovered within that same year.
Several factors impact DoD's ability to achieve their NOR goals. For
example, operational contingencies may force a command or agency to cancel
scheduled maintenance with a WCF activity. If the WCF activity is unable to fill
the vacancy left by this cancellation, they experience idle capacity and a loss of
expected revenue. Since customer rates are predetermined prior to the FY, the
WCF activity is unable to fully cover their annual operating costs and they
experience an operating loss. DoD WCF policy requires that operating losses in
prior years be offset in subsequent years.
DoD's WCF losses totaled $2.4 billion in FY 1997. (DoD, Spring 1998, p.
10) To address this operating loss, DoD proposed: (1) selling and not replacing
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inventory ($23OM), (2) increasing prices and adding a surcharge for WCF
customers to raise cash ($1,092M), and (3) transferring cash from the stockpile
account to the WCF ($265M). DoD's intention was to use these additional funds
to raise cash levels within the WCF corpus. As a result, the funds will not be
available to cover FY99 operating expenses or to buy inventory. (DoD, Spring
1998, p. 10)
The sum effect of DoD's WCF policy represented a $1,587M FY99
negative outlay estimate. DoD summarized their argument as follows: "CBO
believes the WCF should be managed to break even and outlays should approach
zero each year. This is correct when cash balances are adequate and there is no
threat of insolvency. However, this is not the current situation and DoD must raise
cash to ensure solvency of the fund." (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 10)
DoD claimed that CBO ignored the Department's attempt to build cash
within the WCF. More likely, CBO was unaware of DoD plans until after the
Budget was submitted and the joint report was prepared. Understandably, CBO's
outlay estimate did not recognize the cash transfer from the stockpile account and
estimated that the WCF would experience outlay levels much closer to the
historical policy goal of a NOR equal to zero. Consequently, CBO estimated a
negative outlay within the WCF of only $223M. (DoD, Spring 1998, pp. 3, 9-10)
(Raines and O'Neill, 1998, pp. 10, 15-16) The net effect from the different
estimating assumptions used by CBO and OMB-DoD was a WCF outlay estimate
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discrepancy of $1,364M. (DoD, FY 1999 Defense Outlays, pp. 3, 9-10) (Raines
and O'Neill, 1998, pp. 10, 15-16)
2. RDT&E, AF
The slide which presented DoD 's justification of their RDT&E, AF outlay
estimate is provided in Figure 4.1.
Appropriation: RDT&E, Air Force $ In Millions
Outlay difference 667
• FY 1999 New BA(BA)/PY Available to Spend 21,411




FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
- RDT&E, AF first year % 44.3 47.2 46.7 57.9
Analysis:
CBO's estimate places too much emphasis on one year's (FY97) experience. Last year
DoD estimated first year RDT&E.AF outlays at 42.7%. DoD recognized the prior year
trend experience and raised its estimate from 42.7% to 50.7%. This exceeds the four
year (FYs 94-97) average of 49.0%.
DoD took into account the increasing trend observed from prior year actuals. As a
result, DoD's estimate is greater than any of the years prior to FY 1997 and is
approximately the mid point between the average of the FY94 through FY96 actuals and
the FY97 actual.
Source: (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 12).
Figure 4.1. Appropriation: RDT&E, Air Force
Figure 4.1 clearly illustrates that the RDT&E, AF argument centers on
differences in historical trend analysis. DoD experienced an upward shift during
FY97 in the spend-out rate for this account. They claim to have recognized this
shift in their 50.7 percent estimate by using a mid-point estimating technique that
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represents a value half-way between the FY94/95/96 average and the FY97 spend-
out rate. (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 12) This gives them an estimate greater than any
of the actual spend-out rates from FY94 through FY96.
CBO also argues that the upward trend will continue. However, they have
attributed more relative weight to the FY97 actuals in arriving at their outlay
estimate of 53.5 percent. CBO's method applies a rate that is slightly higher than
the two-year average of FY96/97 actuals.
It's difficult to argue for one side or the other, but it's evident that a
"standard method" for conducting historical trend analysis would be helpful.
Without such a standard, the argument centers around whose method is more
justified rather than why a shift from the "standard method" is warranted.
CBO's estimate is clearly more conservative, and history has shown in
general that outlay estimates within BF 05 1 have been too low from both CBO and
OMB-DoD. (Aycock & Fontaine, 1998, p. 7) Perhaps this gives credence to the
argument that a more conservative approach would lead to more accurate
estimates. In Chapter V, I discuss outlay estimate accuracy in greater detail, but
the evidence is far from conclusive on this issue.
One final issue from the DoD argument is the rudimentary trend analysis
procedures they use to justify their estimate. Using simple averages of recent
execution statistics seems unsophisticated given the availability of more refined
statistical and mathematical modeling techniques. For example, the availability
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and characteristics of BA/outlay data seem ideally suited for regression trend
analysis techniques. Figure 2.1 in chapter II illustrated a direct causal relationship
between current and prior-year BA levels and the outlays they require. A
regression model, using historical actuals between BAs and outlays, should be
able to capture and predict outlays with a high degree of accuracy. At a minimum,
such a model could serve as a standard method from which "initial outlay
estimates" could be formulated.
3. The O&M Accounts
Figures 4.2 through 4.4 provide the slides DoD used to justify their FY99
O&M outlay estimates.
Appropriation: O&M, Air Force $ In Millions
Outlay difference 197
• FY 1999 New BA (BA)/PY Available to Spend 25,394




FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
- 0&M,AF second year % 16.4 21.8 21.9 19.0
Analysis:
DoD O&M.AF rate is based on the average of the last four years slightly lowered to
reflect the decline in WCF advanced billings.
The budget assumes advance billings will be liquidated by the end of FY99. The FY98
and FY99 estimates for advance billings will reflect a decline when compared to FY95,
FY96 and FY97 experience.
The DoD rate is consistent with the execution experience but has also been adjusted to
reflect both the decline in the level of advance billings after FY96 and the
discontinuation of advance billings after FY99.
Source: (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 8)
Figure 4.2. Appropriation: O&M, Air Force
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Appropriation: O& M, Army $ In M illions
Outlay difference 118
• FY 1999 New BA (BA)/PY Available to Spend 24,180




FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
- O&M,A first year % 76.6 75.3 74.1 72.3
Analysis:
DoD estimate reflects the observed declining trend and was based on an average of the
last two year's worth of execution experience
CBO has not recognized the declining trend in the first year outlay rate for this account
This is an example of CBO employing a static rate, one that is consistent with FY95
experience and reflects an upward bias in estimating outlays for this account, given the
past four years of trend data.
Source: (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 7).
Figure 4.3. Appropriation: O&M, Army
ppropriation: O&M, Navy $ In Millions
• Outlay difference 113
• FY 1999 New BA(BA)/PY Available to Spend 26,840




FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
- 0&M,N second year % 15.8 7.6 16.4 16.0
• Analysis:
DoD rate reflects the average execution rate for the three highest years.
CBO used the highest rate experienced in the last four years.
Source: (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 6).
Figure 4.4. Appropriation: O&M, Navy
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Similar to the RDT&E, AF situation, the discrepancy between CBO and
OMB-DoD in this area tends to revolve around differences in historical trend
analysis. Similar arguments about the value of a "standard method" for historical
trend analysis also apply to these accounts.
I mentioned earlier that there is an inherent incentive within OMB-DoD to
formulate "optimistic" outlay estimates due to relatively constraining BBA outlay
caps. Analysis of the three O&M slides (Figures 4.2 through 4.4) reveals that
DoD's estimates are consistently more optimistic, i.e., lower, than CBO's.
However, a review of the slides also shows that DoD is relatively consistent, at
least within the RDT&E, AF and O&M accounts, when applying their trend
analysis methodology.
For example, the basic DoD trend analysis method, described in section C
of this chapter, revealed that they use a "mid-point range using both trend and
average analysis techniques." This mid-point technique is used to generate their
RDT&E, AF estimate, as described in Figure 4.1. If we apply a similar mid-point




Per Figures 4.2 through 4.4, the "rate comparison" percentages used for O&M, A were "first year" rates,
while the O&M, AF and O&M, N percentages were "second year" rates. Explanation of this difference is
expanded in the final paragraph of this section.
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In contrast, CBO's O&M outlay estimates reveal no apparent trend in their
outlay estimating methodology, other than a consistency toward being
conservative. For example, CBO's O&M, AF outlay estimate of 21.6 percent
appears to put great weight on the FY95 and FY96 levels of 21.8 and 21.9 percent,
respectively, vice the declining trend exhibited by the FY97 level (19 percent). In
their O&M, A estimate, the FY95 actuals of 75.3 percent appear to carry the
greatest weight, despite the declining trend exhibited by the FY96 and FY97
actuals (74.1 and 72.3 percent, respectively). Finally, CBO's O&M, N estimate
appears to reflect the FY96 estimate of 16.4 percent, despite lower rates in the
other three years of actual data.
My point here is not that CBO's estimates are too conservative (or not
conservative enough), but rather that there does not appear to be a consistent trend
analysis method from which outlay estimates are derived. I suspect that CBO's
actual estimating techniques are more refined and consistent than the DoD slides
reveal. Unfortunately, the data I've accumulated and reviewed provide little
6 DoD notes that they excluded the FY95 rate of 7.6% (as a statistical outlier) and took a simple average of
FY94, 96, and 97. This technique and resultant estimate remains similar to taking the mid point between an
average of FY 94/96 and FY97.
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detailed insight into CBO's specific estimating procedures, and it has already been
established that a documented procedure does not exist.
More importantly, based on the DoD slides, it appears that DoD analysts
also lack insight into how CBO analysts formulate their outlay estimates. This
issue can only contribute to the difficulty in minimizing outlay estimate
discrepancies between CBO and OMB-DoD. It's difficult to arrive at a mutual
understanding about outlays when a common analytical framework for estimating
outlays between CBO and OMB-DoD does not exist. At a minimum, both sides
should be familiar with each other's estimating techniques in order to anticipate
and minimize outlay differences due solely to a lack of shared information.
One final note about the three O&M accounts. The basis for the spend-out
"rate comparison" between CBO and DoD varied between the three accounts. The
O&M, A slide used a "first year" spend-out rate as the basis for comparison, while
the O&M, AF, and O&M, N slides used a "second year" spend-out rate to
compare CBO and DoD estimates. This begs the question as to why. Per the
CBO/OMB joint report and DoD Briefing slides, the basis for spend-out rate
comparison depended on two factors. First, which DoD spend-out rate was lower
than CBO's estimate? In all three cases, the only DoD spend-out rate that was
lower than CBO's rate was the year used, i.e., the "first year" for the Army and the
"second year" for the Air Force and Navy. Second, the lower rate had to
materially impact the total dollar value of the outlay estimate difference. Table
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3.1 substantiates this second factor. The O&M, A estimate difference of $118
million was primarily due to "new FY99 BA." Thus, the first year spend-out rate
comparison is the most "material" to the outlay estimate problem. This also
makes it the most logical basis for comparison. Similarly, the O&M, AF and
O&M, N estimate differences were most heavily influenced by "prior year BA."
Thus, it was logical that DoD would depict the second year spend-out rates as their
basis for comparison and means to articulate the O&M, AF and O&M, N estimate
differences. (Raines and O'Neill, 1998) (DoD, Spring 1998)
4. SCN
As a procurement account, the behavior of the spend-out for SCN is much
different than that of the WCF, RDT&E, and O&M accounts. Figure 4.5 provides
the slide DoD used to justify their SCN outlay estimate.
DoD's outlay estimate justification for this account follows a similar logic
to their previous arguments. The problem appears to reside in large discrepancies
with second year rates. As shown, DoD uses an averaging technique to justify
their second year rates. In contrast CBO's estimate is much higher than any rate
experienced in the last four years.
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Appropriation: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy S In Millions
• Outlay difference 240
• FY 1999 New BA(BA)/PY Available to Spend 28,330




FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
SCN second year% 20.8 14.8 16.4 15.4
Analysis:
Estimating difference is attributed to significant difference in projected second year
rates.
DoD's estimate reflects an average of the past four years execution experience and also
considers specific program content (the specific mix of shipbuilding programs in each
year's budget request).
CBO's estimate exceeds any rate experience in the last four years.
Source: (DoD, Spring 1998, p. 4).
Figure 4.5. Appropriation: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
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FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE SOLUTION AND FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter, I describe how the FY99 outlay estimate problem was
ultimately resolved and the implications for future outlay estimate discrepancies.
B. DEVELOPMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE FY99 OUTLAY
ESTIMATE DISCREPANCY
The FY99 outlay estimate problem created significant budget and readiness
issues. In order for the defense committees to strictly comply with the CBO
scored spending limitations, the committees would have been forced to either
financially restructure defense programs, cut total defense BA, or seek relief from
the budget committees. The evidence indicates that the resolution of this problem
was primarily developed and implemented within the Senate. A chronology of
key events associated with the development and resolution of the FY99 outlay
estimate problem is provided at Appendix. Amplifying discussion on these events
is provided as follows:
1. Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and Review
The President's FY99 Budget was provided to the Congress in February
1998. At the time of this submission, the CBO/OMB joint report on outlay rates
had not been completed, even though Title 10 U.S.C. 226 requires completion of
this report not later than 15 December. Per CBO's stated outlay-estimating
process, they prepare their preliminary baseline outlay projections in December
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and refine their estimates after they receive the Administration's budget. (Aycock
and Fontaine, 1998) This timeline guarantees that CBO and OMB-DoD analysts
will not achieve outlay consensus prior to the Administration's BES.
2. CBO Outlay Estimate of BES
Based on their analysis of the Administration's budget and prior-year
execution, CBO analysts reported on 4 March that OMB-DoD had underestimated
FY99 defense outlays by $3.6 billion. (CBO, 1998) On 16 March 1998,
Representative Floyd D. Spence, Chairman of the House Committee on National
Security, summarized his committee's frustration with the significant outlay
estimate discrepancies between CBO and OMB-DoD and the compelling need for
a permanent solution:
Following its review of the President 's Budget, CBO has concluded
that OMB understated defense outlays by $3. 6 billion in fiscal year
1999. Last year, CBO concluded that OMB had underestimated
defense outlays by $5.6 billion in fiscal year 1998. Although CBO
and OMB have traditionally had disagreements over the outlay
implications of the President's defense budget request, the problem
has gotten much worse over the past two years. I urge the Budget
Committee to work with the Administration to develop a binding
conflict resolution mechanism to resolve such disputes in advance of
the annual submission of the President 's Budget in the future. If
such a mechanism or process is not agreed upon, I am at a loss to
understand how Congress can address disputes of this magnitude
within the constraints of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997's (BBA)
spending caps. (Spence, 1998)
3. The Stevens Amendment
On 1 April, Senator Domenici proposed for Senator Stevens (Chairman,
Senate Appropriations Committee) an amendment to the FY99 Senate Budget
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Resolution designed to create a means for solving the defense outlay estimate
problem. The following excerpt from the amendment highlights the key concerns
associated with the problem and outlines a process for resolving it:
The Congressional Budget Office outlay estimate ofthe fiscal
year 1999 Department of Defense budget request exceeds
both the outlay limit imposed by the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 and the Office of Management and Budget's outlay
estimate, a disagreement which would force a total restruc-
turing of the Department of Defense's fiscal year 1999
budget.
The restructuring imposed on the Department of Defense
would have a devastating impact on readiness, troop morale,
military quality of life, and ongoing procurement and
development programs.
The restructuring of the budget would be driven solely by
differing statistical estimate made by capable parties.
In a letter dated March 31, 1998, the Director ofthe Office of
Management and Budget identified multiple differences
between the Office of Management and Budget's estimated
outlay rates and the Congressional Budget Office 's estimated
outlay rates.
New information on Department of Defense policy changes
and program execution plans now permit the Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget
Office to reevaluate their initial projections of fiscal year
1999 outlay rates.
Sense of the Senate: It is the Sense of the Senate that not
later than April 22, 1998, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and Secretary of Defense, and
Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall complete
discussions and develop a common estimate of the projected
fiscal year 1999 outlay rates for Department of Defense
accounts. (U.S. Senate, April 1998)
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The amendment offered two key provisions toward solving the FY99 outlay
problem. First, it highlighted the fact that "new information" had surfaced
regarding DoD policy and program execution. Senator Domenici addressed this
new information and its impact in a 27 April memorandum to the chairmen of the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Senate Appropriations Committee
(SAC). The information concerned outlay reductions "based on asset sales and
proposed policy changes in the President's 1999 DoD budget request, including:
(1) management initiatives for the Defense Working Capital Funds (DWCF) and,
(2) alterations in classified activities in two Air Force accounts." (Domenici, April
1998) In the end, these policy initiatives would serve as the primary mechanisms
used to bridge the gap between CBO and OMB estimates.
Second, it provided a timetable for the parties involved to discuss and
develop a consensus toward resolving the estimate discrepancy. While this
suggested process proved to be significant in facilitating a solution, the relative
degree of legislative authority used provides some additional insight into the
outlay estimating problem. This amendment was offered only in the Senate, as
part of a non-binding resolution, and in "Sense of the Senate" language. This
suggests that the outlay estimating problem was of relatively limited concern
within the Congress. You would expect to see more authoritative mechanisms
used to address the issue if it was a high level concern throughout the Congress.
Despite the use of less authoritative mechanisms, it was clear that the FY99 outlay
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problem was a significant issue to the committees most directly involved, at least
in the Senate.
4. The FY99 CBO/OMB Joint Report on Outlays
On 2 April, the directors of CBO and OMB issued a joint report detailing
the FY99 defense outlay estimate differences between CBO and OMB. These
differences (more refined than CBO's preliminary $3.6 billion estimate) were
summarized in Chapter III and totaled $3.7 billion. The joint report described in
05 1 "account-level" detail the primary areas of outlay disagreement between the
two agencies.
5. Senator Domenci's 27 April Memorandum
During April 1998, parties from CBO, OMB, and DoD met as directed.
"The discussions did not resolve the technical matters at issue, but did lead to a
potential alternative means of ameliorating the problem, at least in the Senate."
(Daggett, May 1998, p. 16) As a result of these discussions, Senator Domenici
sent a memorandum on 27 April to the chairmen of the SASC and SAC. In that
memorandum, he recommended that the defense authorization and appropriation
bills take three policy steps designed to reduce FY99 defense outlays. These
policy steps related to the defense WCFs, classified account policies, and DoD
asset sales.
First, Senator Domenici committed to score the FY99 Senate Appropria-
tions and Authorization Bills recognizing the Administration's outlay estimates if
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legislation was passed directing DoD management initiatives within the WCFs.
Second, the Senator agreed to defer to the judgement of the chairmen that certain
classified DoD policy initiatives would have the downward impact on outlays
asserted by DoD. If given assurances from the chairmen concerning outlay
reductions in this area, he would score the Senate Appropriations and Authoriza-
tion legislation in accordance with DoD estimates. Third, he wrote that "if
legislation provides for defense asset sales subject to appropriations, appropriate
savings will be scored." (Domenici, April 1998) Under the auspices of the
Steven's Amendment, CBO, OMB, and DoD estimated that these three initiatives
would produce between $2.6 and $2.9 billion in outlay scoring reductions.
(Domenici, April 1998)
6. Senate FY99 Defense Authorization Bill
On 1 1 May, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported out its FY99
Defense Authorization bill. Per Senator Domenici's 27 April memorandum, the
bill included specific legislative provisions that reduced outlay estimates.
First, section 341 addressed the liquidity ofFY99 WCFs.
The Secretary ofDefense shall administer the working-capitalfunds
ofthe Department ofDefense duringfiscal year 1999 so as to ensure
that the total amount of cash balances in such funds on September
30, 1999, exceeds the total amount ofcash balances in suchfunds on
September 30, 1998, by $1,300,000,000. (U.S. Senate, S. 2060,
1998, p. 58)
Second, the bill included provisions concerning Navy asset sales. Section
1013 of the Senate-passed Authorization bill provided a detailed list of ships
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eligible for transfer to foreign countries. Paragraphs b and c of section 1013
reflected the ships authorized for sale and lease, respectively. (U.S. Senate, S.
2060, 1998, pp. 198-200)
Third, the bill included a second provision concerning DoD asset sales that
authorized the disposal of excess materials from the National Defense Stockpile.
This provision was designed to generate receipts for the United States. (U.S.
Senate, Report 105-189, 1998, p. 433)
In addition to legislative language, Senator Domenici requested in his 27
April memorandum that the chairmen of the SASC and SAC provide assurances
concerning outlay reductions associated with certain classified DoD policy
initiatives. The limited evidence on this issue indicates that Senator Domenici
received these assurances via his staff. On 2 1 May, a memorandum to the Senator
from his staff referenced these assurances as follows: "The Armed Services
Committee staff has provided the requested assurances that its actions on two
classified Air Force accounts will retard 1999 outlays by at least $0.7 billion."
(Wheeler, 1998)
7. Senate FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill
On 2 June, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the FY99
Defense Appropriations bill. Committee action included the consolidation of
funding for the Pentagon's ongoing renovation project from the service and
defense-wide O&M accounts into a separate fund. (U.S. Senate, June 1998, p. 14)
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This transfer is relevant to the outlay problem because this new Pentagon
Renovation Transfer Fund is expected to have a lower spend-out rate than the
O&M accounts from which the money was transferred. (Hoagland, n.d.)
8. The FY99 Defense Authorization Bill
The Senate and House passed the conference agreement on the FY99
Defense Authorization bill on 22 September 1998. The bill included the WCF and
Navy and Defense Stockpile asset sale provisions as provided for in the Senate-
passed version of the legislation. (U.S. House, September 1998, pp. 705, 732, and
pp. 826-27)
9. The FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill
The Senate and House passed the conference agreement on the FY99
Defense Appropriations bill on 25 September 1998. The bill included the Senate's
Pentagon Renovation Transfer provision. (U.S. House, September 1998, p. 9)
10. Summary of Outlay Adjustments
On 2 December 1998, 1 interviewed Mr. G.W. Hoagland, Staff Director for
Senator Domenici, concerning the FY99 outlay problem. This interview
confirmed that Senator Domenici's "three policy steps" served as the basis for the
ultimate resolution of the issue. Mr. Hoagland provided a table that summarized
the specific outlay scoring adjustments made to FY99 national defense legislation.
As indicated in Table 5.1, total adjustments reflected a $2,927 billion
reduction to outlay estimates. The $2,927 billion adjustment consisted of two
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Table 5.1. Outlay Adjustments to FY99 National Defense Legislation
Outlay Adjustments to FY99 National Defense Legislation
($ billions)
Description SBu Adjustment UBU Scoring
(based on Legislation)
1. Maintain Larger On-hand Cash in WCF 1.300
2. Adhere to Administration Policies in Classified
AF Accounts 0.700
3. National Defense Stockpile Sales 0.100
4. Sales of Retired U.S. Navy Ships 0.637





parts. First, $2,190 billion in outlay scoring adjustments were originally
exercised, in the accounts listed, by Senator Domenici under the auspices of the
Senate Budget Committee. (Domenici, April 1998) These provisions were
eventually adopted into national defense legislation as previously described.
Second, CBO scoring adjustments totaling $0,737 billion were made, in the
accounts listed, based on other provisions adopted during the FY99 legislative
process. Once again, these provisions were initiated in the Senate.
While the $2,927 billion adjustment remained short of the $3.7 billion
original outlay estimate difference, the evidence indicates that this level of
adjustment was sufficient to "fix" the problem. Commenting on the defense
outlay problem during Senate debate on the FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill,
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Senator Domenici argued that this amount closed the original $3.7 billion outlay
gap between CBO and OMB-DoD "to manageable dimensions." (Domenici, July
1998) A summary of each of the outlay adjustments presented in Table 5.1 is
provided.
a. Maintain Larger On-hand Cash in WCF
This policy assumption represented the largest area of disagreement,
in terms of outlay dollars, between CBO and OMB-DoD analysts. As indicated in
the original "Domenici solution," this scoring adjustment was dependent on
detailing specific DoD policy initiatives in legislation. The WCF provisions were
introduced in Sections 341-42 of the Senate-passed FY99 Defense Authorization
bill. (U.S. Senate, S. 2060, 1998, p. 58) This provision was adopted by both the
Senate and House and included in Section 1007 of the final FY99 Defense
Authorization Act. The provision addresses the liquidity of DOD's WCFs and
requires that the cash balances at the close of FY99 exceed $1.3 billion. (Public
Law, 105-261, Section 1007, 1998)
b. Adhere to Administration Policies in ClassifiedAF
Accounts
This adjustment reflects the second "policy step" proposed by
Senator Domenici in his 27 April memorandum. Specifically, these adjustments
result from "administrative initiatives" within two classified Air Force accounts
(Other Procurement and R&D). (Hoagland, n.d.) As indicated previously,
66
judgement concerning the validity of this scoring adjustment was deferred to the
defense committee chairmen and ultimately reflected DoD estimates.
c. National Defense Stockpile Sales and Sales ofRetired U.S.
Navy Ships
These adjustments represented the increased asset sales referred to in
the third Domenici "policy step." CBO scoring was adjusted based on legislation
enacted concerning these two asset accounts. Similar to the WCF issue, these two
legislative provisions were first introduced in the Senate as part of their FY99
Defense Authorization Bill. In both cases, the House adopted the provisions and
they became law.
Section 3303 of the Senate-passed FY99 Authorization Bill directed
the disposal of materials from the National Defense Stockpile. The provision was
adopted by the Senate and House and included in Section 3303 of the FY99
Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, the Act directs the President to dispose
of materials in the National Defense Stockpile "so as to result in receipts to the
United States in the amount of $105 million by the end of fiscal year 1999."
(Public Law 105-261, Section 3303, 1998) As indicated in Table 5.1, CBO
ultimately scored the FY99 stockpile sales at $100 million.
Section 1013 of the Senate-passed FY99 Authorization Bill provides
a detailed list of ships eligible for transfer to foreign countries. This provision was
adopted by the Senate and House and included in Section 1235 of the FY99
Defense Authorization Act. Paragraphs b and c of section 1235 reflect the ships
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authorized for sale and lease, respectively. As illustrated in Table 5.1, CBO
derived $637 million in outlay adjustments based on the content of this legislation.
(Public Law 105-261, Section 1235, 1998) (Hoagland, n.d.)
d. Separate Pentagon Renovation Transfer Fund
This adjustment surfaced during the Hoagland interview. It reflects
a new Pentagon Renovation Fund included in the FY99 Appropriations Bill. The
fund was created via a $280 million transfer from O&M (Public Law 105-2620,
1998) and is expected to execute consistent with the relatively slow spend-out
characteristics of a military construction account. Given that the funds were
transferred from high spend-out rate O&M accounts, CBO determined that a $ 1 90
million adjustment for FY99 outlays was appropriate. (Hoagland, n.d.)
In sum, achieving an FY99 outlay estimate solution required a high
degree of collaboration between the key constituencies involved. These
collaborations helped facilitate policy consensus on several issues. Regarding the
$ 1 .3 billion WCF adjustment, DoD argued for a change to WCF policy that would
allow them to retain larger cash balances. CBO's initial outlay estimates reflected
a more traditional WCF cash policy. The DoD policy change was eventually
adopted, but only after specific legislation was enacted to promote enforcement.
Similarly, the $700 million adjustment to the classified Air Force
accounts was scored once the parties agreed to adopt DoD policy assumptions
concerning "administrative initiatives" within these accounts. These initiatives
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were not specifically legislated, but assurances were provided to Senator
Domenici and his staff from staffs within the SASC and SAC. (Hoagland, n.d.)
Finally, the remaining three accounts, totaling $927 million,
reflected scoring adjustments based on other policy and legislative initiatives that
surfaced during congressional budget process negotiations.
Of the original $3.7 billion outlay estimate difference, the Congress
addressed $2,927 billion during their development and enactment of FY99
national defense legislation. Senator Domenici confirmed on the Senate floor that
these actions reduced the outlay estimate problem to "manageable dimensions."
(Domenici, July 1998) Consequently, the actions avoided the negative effects on
readiness and modernization that were feared in the event the defense committees
would have been forced to strictly comply with the original CBO scored spending
limitations.
Open communication channels between key constituencies appear to
be the linchpin that links all these outlay estimate solutions. Open communication
and a high degree of collaboration is particularly critical between CBO and OMB-
DoD analysts who must ultimately develop the detailed solutions required to solve
these complex issues.
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OUTLAY ESTIMATE DISCREP-
ANCIES
Given the lack of progress on improving the outlay estimating process
between CBO and OMB, congressional frustration with continuing outlay estimate
disagreements remain. Chairman Spence's 16 March letter clearly illustrates this
high level of frustration. (Spence, 1998)
During the FY99 process, Senator Domenici also expressed his position
regarding key elements he considered vital toward improving the outlay estimating
process. Specific items addressed by the Senator included timely submission of
the annual CBO/OMB joint report, close coordination between CBO and OMB-
DoD analysts throughout the budget and legislative processes, completion of
detailed joint analysis by CBO and the Administration of past outlay estimate
differences, and timely explanation and justification by DoD of policy changes
that, in DoD's judgement, CBO failed to recognize during the scoring process.
(Domenici, April 1998)
Despite congressional concerns and prior legislative action, the evidence
reveals that little has been done to improve the overall outlay estimating process
between CBO and OMB-DoD. CBO and OMB-DoD failed to meet the 15
December FYOO joint report deadline. (Gallo, February 1999) CBO reported a
preliminary FYOO outlay estimate imbalance of $10 billion. (CBO, 1999) The
joint report format does not address the policy and technical assumptions used to
develop outlay estimates. (Raines and O'Neill, 1998) A documented analytical
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method to estimate outlays does not exist in either CBO or OMB-DoD. (Gallo,
February 1999)
An OMB outlay analyst summed up the status of near-term improvements
to the outlay estimation process as follows: "I can say that no new policies have
been implemented as a result of the FY99 difference." (Gallo, February 1999) As
a consequence, I suspect significant outlay estimate discrepancies will continue
until reforms, like those recommended by Senator Domenici, are effectively
implemented. This assertion is strongly substantiated by the FYOO $10 billion




VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER
STUDY POTENTIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes previously developed issues and
findings regarding the FY99 outlay estimate problem. Conclusions and
observations are offered regarding both the causal factors that contributed to the
FY99 problem and its ultimate solution. In addition, management actions
designed to minimize future outlay estimate problems are recommended.
The chapter is divided into four sections. First, it reviews the key causal
factors associated with the FY99 outlay estimate problem. The second section of
the chapter focuses on the solution that emerged in response to this problem.
Observations are offered regarding the applicability of the FY99 solution to future
outlay estimate problems. The third section draws on the conclusions and
observations offered in the first two sections and recommends potential
management actions designed to minimize future outlay estimate discrepancies.
Finally, the fourth section suggests possible areas for further study concerning this
issue.
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B. IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL FACTORS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE PROBLEM
Several causal factors associated with the FY99 outlay estimate problem
were discussed in Chapter IV. In this section, I highlight and assess those key
factors that were most contributory to the FY99 outlay problem.
1. WCF Policy
The WCF outlay estimate discrepancy of $1,364M was the largest area of
disagreement, in terms of outlay dollars, between CBO and OMB-DoD analysts.
As I have discussed, the nature of estimating WCF outlays is complex. However,
the policy difference that drove the FY99 WCF outlay estimate discrepancy is
rather straightforward. Prior-year DoD WCF execution data revealed substantial
financial losses within the fund. DoD policy requires that these losses be
recovered to ensure solvency of the fund. Consequently, DoD projected that
approximately $1,587M in net cash from other DoD sources would not be used
during FY99 WCF operations, i.e., they would not create obligations/ disburse-
ments with the accumulated cash. The net effect of this policy action was a
negative outlay to the budget sub-function 051 bottom-line.
In contrast, CBO analysts assumed the more traditional DoD WCF policy
of a net operating result (NOR) closer to zero. Thus, it's perfectly logical that
CBO's FY99 outlay estimate reflects a much lower negative outlay. In fact,
CBO's FY99 outlay estimate projected a $223M negative outlay. Thus, an outlay
discrepancy of $1,364M between CBO and OMB-DoD occurred. As discussed in
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Chapter V, resolution of this policy disagreement was the single biggest element
within the congressional FY99 outlay estimate solution.
2. The Outlay Estimating Process
Congress recognized that there were several procedural problems
associated with the estimating process, and legislation was passed in the late 1980s
designed to improve the process by ensuring CBO and OMB worked together
toward minimizing outlay estimate disagreements. Yet, the evidence is clear that
the intent of the legislation is not being followed by either CBO or OMB-DoD.
First, the CBO/OMB FY99 joint report was not completed in time to serve as a
viable FY99 budgetary planning document. The same thing happened with
respect to the FYOO budget. As a result, CBO reported a preliminary FYOO outlay
estimate difference between CBO and OMB-DoD of $10 billion. Finally, the
content of the current joint report falls short of resolving outlay estimate
discrepancies and explaining the technical assumptions used to derive those
estimates. Rather, it serves to simply document the amount of disagreement
between CBO and OMB-DoD.
It is difficult to determine how successful a CBO/OMB joint review
process would be if the entire process were to be conducted prior to the Budget's
February submission. What is clear, however, is that failure to meet the 15
December joint report deadline and to enhance the substance of the report will
continue to undermine the intent of the 1980s legislation. As a consequence,
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significant outlay estimate disagreements will continue to pass unresolved to the
congressional committees for final resolution.
3. Outlay Estimate Analytical Methodology
Discussions with CBO and OMB analysts confirm that a consistent and
documented analytical method for estimating outlays does not exist within or
between the agencies. DoD FY99 outlay estimate justification reveals that the
variances between CBO and OMB-DoD in estimating methodology, specifically
historical trend analysis, is the primary reason for different outlay estimates in the
RDT&E, O&M, and SCN account areas. As presented in paragraph B.2 above, a
more timely and effective outlay estimating process could serve to resolve these
differences prior to budget submission. Short of such an effective process
however, a documented joint estimating methodology that established trend
analysis parameters for each appropriation title would assist CBO and OMB-DoD
analysts in their mutual quest for realistic and comparable estimates.
4. Variability Within DoD Programs
The inherent variability and complexities of the DoD's many programs also
account for the fact that equally competent analysts will often disagree concern-
ing outlay estimate projections. Factors that illustrate this variability and
complexity include the long lead-time required for budget preparation, the limited
amount of recent historical data, the complexity of tracking the amount and timing
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of DoD legislative transfer authority, and the significant impact of WCF policy
changes on the timing and amount of future disbursements. (Aycock and Fontaine,
1998, pp. 7, 12-14)
Figure 6.1 illustrates the recent history of differences between CBO and
OMB in estimating defense outlays. It indicates that outlay estimates over the past
several years have been underestimated by both CBO and OMB-DoD. However,
CBO estimates have been consistently more accurate than OMB-DoD estimates.
OUTLAY ESTIMATES
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The 1998 actuals is a preliminary CBO estimate.
1998 1999
Source: (CBO, Budget Authority and Outlay Estimates 1994 Through 1999.
n.d.).
Figure 6.1. Outlay Estimates CBO &OMB Scoring of Requests
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This fact would support congressional deference to CBO's more
conservative outlay estimates and methodology. However, as the FY99 solution
revealed, this did not seem to heavily influence congressional decision-makers,
since much of what OMB-DoD proposed and defended was eventually adopted.
I point to the inherent variability and complexities summarized by Aycock
and Fontaine to help explain why it is difficult for CBO or Congress to refute
Administration estimates. Given these inherent problems, all parties involved
must be "realistic" about the level of precision obtainable when estimating DoD
outlays. Although the $3.7 billion estimate difference for FY99 is large in real
terms, it represents only approximately 1.5 percent of the total DoD budget for
that year. Thus, challenging outlay estimates when the difference reflects such a
relatively small portion of the budget is likely to occur only when strict constraints
on outlays are operative, as they were for FY99.
One final note about causal factors associated with the FY99 outlay
estimate problem. Prior-year outlay estimate problems were explored to deter-
mine if significant and relevant patterns existed which could provide additional
insight into the FY99 problem. Several documents that addressed outlay estimate
problems in the late 1980s were reviewed. These documents offered little specific
insight into the FY99 problem, but did confirm that the procedural issues that
plagued the FY99 process have been present for some time. As with FY99, the
outlay estimate differences in the late 1980s involved disagreements between CBO
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and OMB-DoD regarding defense policy assumptions and implementation
associated with O&M spend-out rates and revolving funds (synonymous with
FY99 WCF). For example, CBO's outlay estimate for FY90 was $3.8 billion
higher than estimates submitted by DoD. Of that difference, $2.1 billion was
attributed to variances in O&M spending rates and $1 billion was due to the timing
of disbursements within the revolving fund accounts. Both of these issues
illustrate policy issues similar to those we surfaced regarding the FY99 problem.
(Cheney, June and July 1989)
The FY98 outlay estimate difference of $5.6 billion also offered the
potential for insight regarding the FY99 problem. However, this discrepancy
never generated the level of congressional interest and debate offered by the FY99
problem. (Wheeler, 1999) The evidence indicates that the strict BBA outlay
limitations, which proved to be the catalyst for congressional interest in FY99,
were not enacted until late summer 1997. (Elving and Taylor, 1997) The DoD
and congressional budget cycles suggest that CBO and OMB-DoD outlay estimate
differences for the upcoming year logically surface in early spring. Clearly the
timeline provided in the Appendix illustrates this logic, i.e., CBO refines and
reports their outlay estimate after they receive the President's budget in February.
Therefore, the FY98 BBA outlay constraints were not a factor during the spring of
1997, when the $5.6 billion outlay difference was surfaced by CBO. (Wheeler,
1999) Consequently, the FY98 outlay issue did not generate the high level of
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congressional interest experienced during FY99, when the outlay problem was
essentially the "test-case" for enforcing the agreed upon BBA outlay limitations.
In fact, there was so little congressional interest in the FY98 outlay difference that
the FY98 joint CBO/OMB outlay report to the Budget Committees (and others)
was never completed. (Gallo, March 1999)
C. THE FY99 OUTLAY ESTIMATE SOLUTION
The FY99 outlay estimate problem generated important defense budget and
readiness issues. CBO's estimate of DoD's FY99 outlays was $3.7 billion higher
than the Department's estimate. Under the CBO estimate, the Department's
outlays would exceed FY99 defense spending targets established in both the
Senate-passed FY99 Budget Resolution and the 1997 Balanced Budget Act
(BBA).
Given these budget concerns, the congressional defense committees
had
three alternatives. They could either financially restructure defense programs,
cut
defense BA levels, or request relief from the Budget Committees. Congressional
and DoD experts agreed that the first two alternatives, restructuring or cutting
the
defense budget, were untenable since their implementation
"would have a
devastating impact" on defense readiness. (U.S. Senate, April 1998) Thus,
the




Specifically, the solution to the FY99 outlay estimate problem was
primarily developed and implemented within the Senate. The Appendix provides
a chronology of significant events associated with this solution. In the end, the
FY99 outlay estimate solution revealed the importance of collaboration among key
congressional players. These included primarily the Senate Budget Committee
(SBC), CBO, OMB, and DoD. This collaboration facilitated policy consensus, in
large part underwritten in legislation, on several issues important to reducing
CBO's FY99 outlay estimates.
The issues involved in the FY99 outlay estimate solution related to WCF
policy, administration policies in two classified Air Force Accounts, asset sales
from the National Defense Stockpile and the U.S. Navy, and the transfer ofO&M
dollars to the Pentagon Renovation Transfer Fund. With regard to WCF policy,
DoD successfully argued for the need to retain larger cash balances. The net
effect of this policy change was an outlay estimate adjustment of $1.3 billion. It is
important to note that this estimate adjustment was scored only after specific
legislation was enacted effecting the policy change.
As part of the outlay estimate negotiations, $700 million in defense outlay
savings were scored within two classified Air Force accounts. The savings related
to unspecified "administrative initiatives" within these two accounts. Although
specific legislation addressing these initiatives was not adopted, Senator Domenici
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was provided assurances from the Senate defense committees regarding the
validity of the scoring adjustments.
An additional $737 million in FY99 outlay savings was scored based on
asset sales within two DoD accounts. These adjustments were based on legislation
related to sales affecting the National Defense Stockpile and several retired U.S.
Navy ships.
Finally, $190 million in outlay savings was scored based on legislation
directing the transfer of O&M dollars to the Pentagon Renovation Transfer Fund.
Since the Pentagon Renovation Transfer Fund is expected to execute at a slower
spend-out rate than O&M, the outlay savings were determined to be applicable.
As a result of these policy actions, the original $3.7 billion estimate
problem was reduced by $2,927 billion. Senator Domenici referred to the
remaining outlay estimate difference of $.773 billion as a "manageable" problem.
Consequently, the policy actions undertaken avoided the negative effects on
readiness that had originally been feared.
D. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE FY99 SOLUTION
The driving force behind the heightened congressional interest in the FY99
outlay estimate problem appeared to be the outlay limits imposed by the Balanced
Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. Supported by CBO analysis, the Congress (primarily
the Senate Budget, Armed Services and Appropriations Committees) felt that the
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Administration's FY99 budget request generated outlays that exceeded the
bipartisan BBA limits.
It has been established that the BBA, and earlier budget process reforms,
reflect legislation developed primarily to reduce the deficit. Robert Reischauer
notes that deficits (and deficit reduction) have underscored "many important but
divisive questions involving the philosophy of government..." over the last 20
years. (Reischauer, 1997) Given the importance deficits have played within the
U.S. political landscape, it's not surprising that proponents of deficit reduction are
firmly committed to adhering to the outlay limits imposed by the BBA.
Thus, when it was determined by CBO that the Administration had
exceeded these limits, powerful budget leaders within the Congress took special
interest in highlighting and rectifying the problem. Following Senators Domenici
and Steven's lead, the Congress solved the FY99 outlay problem by bringing
together the key players concerned, finding and developing policy consensus that
generated outlay savings within the budget, and by implementing those policies
through legislative provisions and member assurances.
It has been indicated that the preliminary FY00 outlay estimate difference
totals approximately $10 billion. The composition of that difference suggests that
much of it appears similar to, although much larger than, the FY99 problem.
Of the $10 billion, about $6 billion can be attributed to the
differences in analytical judgement about spend-out rates for new
appropriations and assumptions about the timing of disbursements
of unexpended balances that have generated differences in the past.
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The remaining $4 billion difference can be traced to the Administra-
tion's not including in the defense budget the outlays from 1999
contingent emergency appropriation funding that had not been
released at the time the budget was presented to the Congress, and
to different estimates of the effect of an assortment of proposed
changes in Department ofDefense practices. (CBO, March 1999)
CBO's comments illustrate three areas where similarities exist between the
FY99 and FYOO estimate differences. First, the variability in analytical trend
analysis interpretation is similar to the problems experienced in the FY99 R&D
and O&M accounts. Second, FY99 WCF differences revolved around disputes
over the timing of disbursements. Finally, changes to DoD "practices" appears
similar to varying policy interpretations between CBO and DoD analysts, which
was a similar phenomenon highlighted in FY99.
Given these similarities, finding budget policy consensus through
collaboration will be required, as it was in FY99. A high degree of congressional
interest could also produce legislative provisions designed to implement outlay
savings agreements reached through this collaborative effort.
However, several factors indicate that similar "legislative solutions" in
FYOO would be more problematic. First, the magnitude of the problem is
obviously much larger. It's logical to assume that crafting legislation designed to
reduce outlays by approximately $10 billion would be significantly more difficult
than addressing the $3.7 billion problem in FY99.
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Second, CBO forecasts federal budget surpluses for the next several years.
(CBO, January 1999, p. 1) Over the past 20 years, deficits have helped
substantiate the policy arguments for discretionary spending reform and/or
reductions. Without deficits, it's highly probable that outlay caps or outlay
estimate differences will generate less concern within the Congress. Although the
estimating problem may continue to generate concern within the committees most
directly involved, the political capital required to enact legislative solutions may
be difficult to muster in a "surplus" environment.
The BBA outlay caps, the DoD "readiness crisis", and this emerging
"surplus" environment provide the context within which the outlay issue will be
addressed in the future. Recent history illustrates this conflicting contextual
environment. This thesis discusses a rather intense and comprehensive struggle to
constrain defense outlays as part of a larger policy to control deficits via the BBA
spending limits. It has been shown that this struggle led to passage of FY99
defense authorization and appropriations legislation that included provisions
designed to implement outlay savings agreements.
As the FY99 Authorization and Appropriations Bills were being completed,
Congress was confronted with the DoD "readiness crisis". "In September 1998,
congressional Republicans and the Joint Chiefs of Staff clashed publicly over the
readiness of today's U.S. military and the truthfulness of previous testimony that
the Chiefs had delivered to Congress." (Brookings Institute, 1999) This debate
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led to congressional demands for an FY99 "emergency" defense-related
supplemental.
The "emergency" supplemental appropriation eventually enacted in October
1998 provided $7,586 billion in new BA for defense, with a corresponding
increase to FY99 outlays of $5,849 billion. (CBO, 16 March 1999) In accordance
with BBA rules, this supplemental does not "count" against the BBA spending
limits, i.e., it's "free money" within the context of the politically charged BBA.
Prior to the "surplus" environment, member concerns about the deficit
would help limit this type of spending. An indication of this concern is vividly
illustrated by this thesis. Deficits have fueled budget policy arguments and led to
discretionary spending reforms, including the BBA spending limitations. We have
shown that the $3.7 billion outlay estimate difference generated significant
concern and action within the Congress because they felt the Administration had
violated the BBA spending limits on outlays.
Although the deficit is no longer an issue, many members remain
concerned about the political consequences associated with openly breaching the
BBA limits. On the other hand, many in Congress believe we face a very real
"readiness crisis" and modernization backlog brought on by years of inadequate
defense budgets. Given these conflicting factors, it is not surprising that Congress
has used the "emergency supplemental" as a vehicle to increase funding for
defense.
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The Kosovo crisis and related funding action offers a similar example of
using this approach to increase defense funding. The crisis has prompted the
President to request $5.5 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations in
support of DoD operations. Congress ended up approving an "emergency"
supplemental worth $11.5 billion for the crisis in Kosovo. (U.S. House of
Representatives, May 1999) This action hardly reflects a Congress oriented
toward spending control. Although many other political issues may be reflected in
this congressional action, it does appear that spending control was not an
important issue in its deliberations.
A similar phenomenon is present in FY00. After several years of real (after
inflation) decline in defense funding, the President's FY00 Defense Budget reflects
"an end to the decline in military funding that has been underway since the mid-
1980s." (Daggett, 1999) The Administration's budget request basically holds the
line in FY00 (-0.6 percent real decline) and reflects a 4.4 percent increase in
FY01. (Daggett, 1999) However, many members in Congress continue to believe
that the level of growth reflected in the President's request is insufficient.
Consequently, the Congress has approved in their FY00 Concurrent Resolution an
$8 billion increase (over the President's request) for defense. (U.S. House of
Representatives, April 1999) The dilemma for congressional members who
support this increase in defense is similar to the conflicting budgetary factors they
faced in FY99. They support defense increases but would prefer to remain within
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the BBA established spending caps. However, "to stay within the caps while
giving defense the increase they want will require sharp cuts elsewhere."
(Washington Post, 1999)
In sum, the "readiness crisis" and modernization problems and the lure of
budget surpluses are making it increasingly difficult for Congress to fund defense
at the level they feel is necessary while abiding by the BBA limits. In FY99 it
appears that "emergency" supplemental are providing some short-term relief to
their political dilemma. This is the context within which future outlay estimate
issues will be addressed.
Finally, the details surrounding the FY99 legislative solutions do not appear
to offer sustainable adjustments to outlays. Two examples from the FY99 solution
help illustrate this point. First, the WCF legislation is clearly a one-time
adjustment. DoD needed to generate the excess cash within these accounts due to
prior-year losses. The FY99 "negative outlay" is only applicable to FY99, unless
similar losses continue to accrue. Second, the outlay savings associated with DoD
asset sales reflect single events designed to generate revenue. They do not reflect
sustainable outlay reduction mechanisms. Asset sales should be based on DoD
policy decisions and not used to reduce outlays below prescribed spending limits.
It's unclear whether the classified administrative initiatives or the Pentagon
Renovation Transfer Fund reflect sustainable adjustments for future outlay
88
estimates. However, it's likely that these initiatives offer a "one-time" opportunity
to reduce outlays within the FY99 budget.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
Two fundamental management actions are recommended to minimize
outlay estimate problems in the future. While the management actions suggested
appear straightforward, the reader should appreciate the difficulty associated with
implementing these actions considering the complexity of both the budget process
and the data involved.
1. Overall Process Improvements
Problems stemming from the outlay estimating process revolved around the
inability to determine and coordinate vital information in a timely manner. It has
been shown that CBO and OMB failed to meet either the FY99 or FYOO joint
report deadline of 15 December. Their failure in meeting these deadlines strongly
suggests that information key to minimizing outlay estimate differences was either
not available or not shared prior to budget submission. In addition, the content of
the final report also suggests that the information being developed and shared via
the joint reporting process was insufficient to resolve the policy and technical
assumptions critical to minimizing the outlay estimate differences between the two
agencies.
For example, the WCF discrepancy suggests that despite the joint reporting
process, a significant policy assumption concerning WCF cash accumulation was
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not sufficiently conveyed between applicable analysts. The
apparent inability of
the current reporting process to highlight the
impact of even this "significant"
policy assumption represents an ominous sign of the deficiencies
associated with
the existing process. It has been established that the
inherent variability and
complexity of DoD's many programs make outlay estimation an
extremely
complex task. Without open and timely information exchange
between applicable
analysts, achieving comparable outlay estimates prior
to budget submission
becomes next to impossible.
The obvious solution to this information problem is to
improve the
substance of the joint process and report and to meet the 15
December deadline. It
is clear from the 1980s legislation directing the requirements
associated with the
joint CBO/OMB outlay estimating process that the intent was to address key
policy and technical issues prior to submission of the budget
in order to minimize
outlay differences. Representative Spence goes as far as
to suggest that a "binding
conflict resolution mechanism...or process" (Spence, 1998)
should be developed
to resolve outlay disputes prior to budget submission.
Senator Domenici's recommendations for improving the
process best
summarize the management actions required. These
recommendations included
timely submission of the joint report, close coordination
between CBO and OMB-
DoD analysts, joint analysis of past outlay estimate differences,
and timely
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explanation and justification of DoD policy changes significantly impacting
historical outlay rates. (Domenici, April 1998)
2. Analytical Method Improvements
It is recommended that CBO and OMB-DoD analysts develop and
document a joint analytical model for estimating outlays. It has been shown that a
documented analytical method for estimating outlays does not exist within either
CBO or OMB-DoD. This fact clearly exacerbates the difficulties associated with
minimizing the outlay differences between the two agencies.
A joint analytical method that establishes similar statistical approaches
would help minimize the differences in outlay estimates. Consistent statistical
trend analysis methods and parameters could be established within each account,
e.g., O&M, RDT&E, designed to clearly link outlay estimates to a given level of
BA. Specifying these methods and parameters and incorporating them in a
broader mathematical model would unequivocally establish "initial outlay
estimates" derived from historical data. The overall outlay estimating process
could then allow for policy arguments and focused debate when either agency
wanted to deviate from the established norm.
F. FURTHER STUDY POTENTIAL
This thesis focused on identifying and analyzing the primary causal factors
associated with the FY99 outlay discrepancy between CBO and OMB-DoD.
Clearly, congressional legislation and member statements are directed toward
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improving the procedural coordination, timing of input, and
historical under-
standing of the outlay estimating process. To this end and from
an analytical
perspective, further research is required to develop the mathematical
models
capable of linking BA and outlays.
A regression model might be a viable approach to pursue. A regression
model using BA levels as the independent variable should be able to capture and
predict outlays (the dependent variable) with a high degree of
accuracy. Figure
2.1 in Chapter II illustrated a causal direct relationship
between current and prior-
year BA levels and the outlays they require. Figure 6.2 plots Defense BA and
outlay levels between 1945 and 1995.
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Defense Budget Authority and Outlays






-1 \ 1 \ V. //






1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1965 1975
Fiscal Years
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Source: (CB0, Budget Authority and Outlay Estimates 1994 - 1999, n.d).
Figure 6.2. Defense Budget and Outlays
These graphs appear to illustrate that BA and outlay levels possess a high degree
of historical correlation. This fact suggests that a regression model (or multiple
models at the account level) could be developed that use BA levels to forecast
future outlays. Development of viable regression models could serve as a standard
analytical method from which "initial outlay estimates" could be formulated. In
this way, progress toward achieving a better understanding of the outlay




APPENDIX. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE SIGNIFICANT
EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE FY 1999





The FY99 President's budget is released.
CBO's preliminary estimate of FY99 outlays is




The Steven's Amendment to the FY99 Senate Budget
Resolution is offered. The Amendment addresses the
FY99 defense outlay problem and proposes a means
for resolving most of it.
The CBO/OMB FY99 Joint Report on Defense
Outlays is released, providing account-level detail
concerning the FY99 outlay estimate difference





Per the Steven's Amendment, CBO, OMB, and DoD
officials meet and develop alternatives for resolving
the outlay problem.
Senator Domenici, Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, sends a memorandum to the chairmen of
the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees concerning the FY99 outlay problem.
The Senator proposes three policy steps designed to
reduce outlays. These steps relate to defense working
capital funds (WCFs), administration policies in classi-
fied Air Force accounts, and asset sales. All three
policy steps would result in reduced defense outlay
estimates.
The Senate Armed Services Committee reports out the
FY99 Defense Authorization bill with outlay policy
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provisions. The legislation specifically addresses the
WCF and asset sale provisions proposed by Senator
Domenici. Assurances are provided by the authoriza-
tion and Appropriations Committees that outlay
estimate adjustments of $700 million deriving from
other accounts are applicable.
2 June 1998 The Senate Appropriations Committee reports out its
FY99 Defense Appropriations bill. The bill includes a
transfer of funds from O&M to the Pentagon
Renovation Fund, reducing estimated FY99 defense
outlays by $190 million.
22 September 1998 The Senate and House pass the final FY99 Defense
authorization bill incorporating WCF and asset sale
policy provisions. These provisions reduce defense
outlay estimates by $1.3 billion and $737 million,
respectively.
25 September 1998 The Senate and House pass the final FY99 Defense
Appropriations bill incorporating the transfer from
O&M to the Pentagon Renovation Fund. This transfer
reduces defense outlay estimates by $190 million.
Adjustment Summary:
(in billions)
FY99 Outlay Estimate Problem $3,700
WCF Adjustment ($ 1 .300)
Administration Policy Assurances ($0,700)
Asset Sales Adjustment ($0,737)
Pentagon Renovation Adjustment ($0.190)
Residual Outlay Estimate Difference $0,773
7
This residual difference was determined to be "manageable." (Domenici, 1998).
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